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The topic of this thesis is the Chinese view of world order centered on the concept of 
Tianxia (天下 – all-under-heaven). After an historical excursus on the origin of the 
Chinese imperial sociopolitical and philosophical system, the thesis explores the main 
characteristics of the early empires. Afterwards, the thesis attempts a comparison 
between the ancient Chinese empire and another ancient empire, the Roman Empire. The 
objective is to dig deeply within the political, administrative and legal roots of both 
empires, as they are the ancestors of two big civilizations: China and the West. Because 
of the great influence that these two antique political systems had on the current political 
arrangements of the two parts of the globe, the comparison should help detect the 
foundation of the systems and will allow to better understand the differences between 
them and the peculiarities of China’s view of world order. Furthermore, the thesis 
analyzes the concept of Tianxia in post-1949 China, concentrating on the new 
applications of the concept, also drawing a comparison between political organization of 
imperial China in the past and the PRC (People’s Republic of China) of our time. Lastly, 
the thesis explores how some scholars in today’s China are reexamining, reframing, and 
re-advocating the ancient concept of Tianxia as China’s new and alternative view of 
world order in the post-Cold War world. 
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This thesis is about the Chinese view of world order centered on the concept of 
Tianxia (天下 – all-under-heaven). I will clarify the concept and then discuss the 
development of it from its first appearance and adaptation in Chinese history until its 
contemporary reappearances, with a comparison to the alternative worldviews of the 
Roman Empire and the Westphalia System.  
 
The structure of the thesis is outlined as follows.  
The Introduction chapter presents an historical excursus on the origin of the 
Chinese imperial sociopolitical system. I will explore the main characteristics of the early 
empires, and more specifically of the first unified empire, the empire of the Qin Dynasty 
(秦 221 B.C. – 206 B.C.). Treating the Qin Empire is crucial to understanding of Chinese 
political system because it is for the first time during this period, that a centralized 
bureaucratic political organization based on the world view of tianxia was methodically 
implemented, and used by all subsequent rulers of China. In the same chapter, I will 
explain the main philosophical thoughts that have supported the creation and stability of 
the Chinese long-lasting empire.  
The second chapter attempts a comparison between the ancient Chinese empire 
and another ancient empire, the Roman Empire. The objective of this chapter will be to 
dig deeply within the political, administrative and legal roots of both empires, as I 
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 recognize in them the ancestor of the two big civilizations that I am comparing 
throughout this work; that is, the West and China. I acknowledge a great influence of 
these two antique political systems on the current political arrangements of the two parts 
of the globe; hence, the comparison should help detect the foundation of the systems and 
will allow us to better understand the differences between them and the peculiarities of 
China’s view of world order.  
The third chapter addresses the modern understanding of power and authority and 
explains how contemporary political leaders apply old concepts. After that, I will focus 
on the fate of the concept of tianxia in post-1949 China, concentrating on the new 
applications of the concept. Finally, I will draw a comparison between political 
organization of imperial China in the past and the PRC (People’s Republic of China) of 
our time. Briefly, since its founding on October 1st, 1949, the government of the PRC has 
essentially been formed and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a 
pyramidal sociopolitical structure, which resembles the structure of the China imperial 
system since the Qin Dynasty.  
Lastly, the fourth chapter explores how some scholars in today’s China are 
reexamining, reframing, and re-advocating the ancient concept of tianxia as China’s new 
and alternative view of world order in the post-Cold War world Hereafter, I will lay out 
my findings and further the main objectives of this analysis of China’s ancient 
philosophies and political system: to reveal and evaluate some of the most striking 
aspects of continuity in China. After a massive and costly revolution in the name of 
socialism, equality and justice, the political power in China is still highly concentrated in 
the hands of an emperor-like authoritarian ruler based on an empire-like hierarchy that 
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 controls Chinese institutions, resources, and even people’s minds, closely resemble the 
millennia-old Qin system based on the tianxia worldviews. Yet, the outside world has 
been dominated by the Western, Westphalia system of international relations. The power 
of the tianxia concept and its possible revival and promotion by a rising Chinese power 
will be something the whole world has to deal with very carefully. With that in mind, I 
conclude this thesis by raising questions about the tianxia worldview in the study of 




The testimony of the events of the first millennia of Chinese ancient history (from 
2000 B.C. circa to 200 B.C.) is considerably attributed to two famous books: the Zhou-Li 
周礼 (The Commentary of Zhou) and the Yi-Li 礼记 (The book of Property and Rituals)1. 
Even though the originality of these two books is subject of controversial interpretations, 
they can be used to shade some light over the structure of the ancient empire. The books 
treat the period of the most mythological dynasties; that is, Xia (夏 2100-1600 B.C.), and 
Shang (商 1600-1066 B.C.), and the historical dynasty of the Western Zhou (Xi-Zhou 西
周 1066-771 B.C.).  
The Shang Dynasty is the first dynastic period for which historic records have been 
collected: they are mostly turtle’s shells with pictographic inscriptions on. From other 
testimonies, it is possible to study what is believed to have happened even before the Xia 
                                                
1 Granet, Marcel, Chinese Civilization, (New York: Knopf, 1930). 
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 dynasty. That is, a series of supernatural emperors considered the fundamental 
contributors of the development of the whole and complex humanity. The stories of the 
supernatural emperor are discussed in the book called Shi-Ji 史记 (Records of an 
Historian – completed around 86 B.C.). The compilation of the Shi-Ji is attributed to the 
famous historian Sima Qian2. During the late-Han period (first two centuries A.D.) many 
sections of these records have been changed or influenced by different schools of 
thought, which were trying to shape the idealistic representation of authority to maintain 
order in the society. In any case, in the tradition the famous emperors of the ancient 
China were five (number that corresponds to the theory of the five elements – wood, fire, 
earth, metal and water), and they each represented a crucial innovation, which helped 
shape the whole world. They were: Fu-xi, the emperor who invented the writing system, 
created the institution of marriage, and taught to human beings how to fish, how to hunt 
and how to play music; Shen-nong, who discovered how to cultivate the land and how to 
recognize plants with medical proprieties; Huang-di, the emperor that taught men how to 
make utensils as wheels and carriage, and also knew the art of medicine; finally, there are 
Yao and Shun, who instituted religious rites, made offers to heaven and gave men the first 
laws. After Shun, the emperor Yü was selected, who divided the empire in provinces and 
established the succession to the throne with hereditary method. This is believed to have 
given birth to the Xia dynasty3.  
During the Shang period, the kings were governing through the shamans’ 
communications of the elites’ ancestors with Shangdi 上帝 (God). The end of the Shang 
                                                
2 Sabbatini, M. and Paolo Santangelo, Storia della Cina, (Bari: Laterza, 2004), pp. 39-41. 
3 Bertuccioli, Giuliano, La Letteratura Cinese, (Milano: Sansoni, 1968), pp. 17-20.  
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 Dynasty signed the decline of importance of the shamans and their divinations. It is 
interesting that both the Xia and the Shang dynasty are thought as finished when an 
especially tyrannical emperor had taken power; hence, there was a need to replace the 
tyrant with a morally superior sovereign. In fact, with the following dynasty, the Zhou 
dynasty, the concept of virtue (de 德) appeared for the first time. Each sovereign needed 
to possess virtue to be worth of the Heaven’s Mandate. With the Zhou dynasty, the world 
of divinity got separated from the explanations of the actual world, because during the 
Zhou period this concept of the Mandate of Heaven started changing the concept of 
regality.  
The concept of Mandate of Heaven (tian-ming 天命) started during the Western 
Zhou, developed during the Eastern Zhou (Xi-Zhou 西周 750-256 B.C.) and it increased 
in importance after the Han dynasty (汉 206 B.C. – A.D. 220). Intrinsic in this concept is 
the idea that the whole universe is dominated by an impersonal but omnipotent Heaven 
(tian 天). In order to govern, a man needs to have the Mandate of Heaven, which entrusts 
the ruler with responsibilities for “all-that-is-under-heaven” (tianxia 天下), which is the 
country as a whole. For this reason, Westerners often translated tianxia with the 
comprehensive meaning of empire.4 Hence, starting from the king of Zhou, the ruler was 
considered the Son of Heaven, even though in this name there was not reference to a 
living holy being. 
In 770 B.C. started the period of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (Dong Zhou 东周). 
The capital of the empire was moved to Luoyang, and a new historic period called 
                                                
4 Granet, Marcel, Chinese Civilization, (New York: Knopf, 1930). 
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 ‘Spring and Autumn’ (Chunqiu 春秋) started, which according to the ‘Annals of the 
State of Lu’ (attributed to Confucius) goes from 770 to 476 B.C. During this period the 
states around the central state started to loudly request more autonomy and became more 
worrisome. The centralized feudalism went through a phase of instability; however the 
conflicts were more diplomatic than really militarily engaged, usually. Nevertheless, in 
the year 453 B.C., the territory of the state of Jin was divided into three new states: Han, 
Wei and Zhao. This separation is considered the beginning of a new phase called of the 
Warring States (zhan guo 战国). This period lasted until 222 B.C., when Qin Shi 
Huangdi 秦始皇帝 (which means ‘first emperor of Qin) created the first Chinese 
centralized empire5. Qin Shi Huang “using force, managed to concentrate in his hands the 
power to make law, and obtained legitimization of his violence through the justification 
that he was pursuing a punitive expedition for the Son oh Heaven.”6 
 
Imperial Government Since the Qin 
 
Many scholars have identified the dynasties reported in the book Zhou-Li (The 
Commentary of Zhou) as an elaborate form of centralized feudalism. Of course, the 
definition of feudal system is borrowed from European categories of analysis and, 
consequently, it suffers somewhat a stretching, which at the same time helps clarify the 
Chinese version of feudalism. The difference was in the family relations that linked all 
                                                
5 Granet, Marcel, Chinese Civilization, (New York: Knopf, 1930). 
6 An excerpt from: “A perspective on Chinese General History” (Zhongguo tongshide 
yizhong dufa), 2000. 
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 the various kings and local lords to the king of the central kingdom. In Europe there 
were sort of contractual arrangements between the lord and the vassals, while in China 
the ruling class needed to be somewhat blood related naturally or forcibly. In other 
words, when there was no family relationship, it was imperative to create one, exploiting 
the ‘technique’ of arranged marriages. 
The structure of the empire during the Zhou period was constituted by a central 
state zhongguo 中国 (also the Chinese name for today’s China since the late 19th century) 
and many states guo 国, which were submitted to the central state in a feudal relationship. 
These local states maintained virtual autonomy. According to the records of the Zhou-Li, 
the various states of the empire had different status, proportioned to the distance from the 
royal capital. Each state had its own administration, but the king of the central state, 
(Zhou’s son of heaven) was the one who had the power to select the functionaries, while 
the central kingdom administration was entrusted to six dignitaries: a minister of heaven, 
(for general policy recommendations), of earth (for education), of spring (for court 
rituals), of summer (for routine administration), of autumn (for punishment), and a 
minister of winter (for logistical aspects of government). Moreover, the king of the 
central state had control over six armies, while the different states had one, two, or three 
according to the their rank.7 The doctrine of the Zhou was: “all land is the king’s land, 
and all people are the king’s people”. The central kingdom during the Zhou Dynasty was 
relatively strong. The yearly tribute that the local kings had to pay to the sovereign of the 
central state was one of the features of the empire that started with the Zhou, and 
                                                
7 Hucker, Charles, O., China’s Imperial Past, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1975). 
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 increases its significance with the following dynasties and has been endured for 
centuries. In 536 B.C., the central state promulgated a complete set of rules and 
regulations, which were engraved on bronze. That was the first step to regain the 
unification and bureaucratization that was only accomplished at a brand new level a 
couple of centuries later with the official unification of China under only one centralized 
rule of the emperor, Qin Shi Huang8, the new, almighty, son of the heaven. 
For the sake of accuracy, it is important to clarify that the two books previously 
cited, the Zhou Li and the Li Ji, from which we have the largest section of information 
for the time of the Zhou and previous periods, are both works attributed to scholars of the 
Han period. Hence, the contents of them often reflect more the idealized political beliefs 
and the reality of the Qin-Han period, rather than being accurate records of the political 
structure of the Zhou dynasty. 
To appreciate the Table that follows, we need to keep in mind that the 
establishment of the Qin dynasty changed Chinese history forever. Until the time of the 
Warring States, small kingdoms were violently fighting each other to obtain power. 
However, with the Qin dynasty the feature of the centralized power, which is able to 
establish and maintain power through strict moral and legal control, guaranteed to each 
dynasty the strength that will allow them to keep control authority. Of course, this 
happened no without struggle and violence, but in the end, the following dynasties 
assured continuity until modern history. For this reason, Chinese history is considered a 
circular evolution of dynasties, followed by their crashes, which will be again followed 
by the rise of a new centralized dynasty.  
                                                







Table 1. Chinese Dynasties Chronology 
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Schools of Philosophies 
 
The period from the time of ‘Spring and Autumn’ to the end of the ‘Warring 
States’ is known for turbulence and instability, but also for the new philosophies and 
beliefs that flourished and that shaped forever the future of Chinese views and thinking. 
The difficulties of the era stimulated the Chinese to think of pragmatic solutions to create 
a society where living was not unfeasible because of ongoing wars and hostilities. The 
different prescriptions to face the troubles of the era are divided in three big streams of 
thought: Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism, among many others. I will hereafter 
explore the main characteristics of each of these three philosophies, as understanding 
them is crucial to examine the Chinese political organization and ideals in both ancient 
and modern times.  
Before explaining the basic differences of each philosophical thought, it is 
extremely important to understand that the roots of most Chinese political thoughts are in 
the idea that the universal cosmos is a sole and indivisible entity, for which there is no 
beginning and there will be no end. Chinese have a holistic conception of the world, 
which they believe to be divided into three principal elements: heaven, earth, and man. In 
this interpretation man and heaven are part of the same universe, in which on one hand, 
Heaven, with the words of Mo Zi: “desires life and hates death, desires wealth and hates 
poverty, desires order and hates disorder. […] Heaven desires righteousness and hates 
11 
 unrighteousness.”9 On the other the hand, the man tries to behave at his best. The 
ruler’s responsibility is to cope with the other two elements, heaven and earth. For this 
purpose the ruler can ask for help to the spirits of the ancestors that eternally continue to 
be part of the universe. 
 
Confucianism 
The philosophy of Confucianism is a complex set of ethical and political ideas 
that put emphasis on social and political relationships, generally modeled after a paternal 
family structure. Confucianism draws its name from the founder of this philosophy, Kong 
Fu Zi. The name of Kong Fu Zi has been rendered in Latin with the phonetic translation 
of Confucius, from where the school name also comes from. Confucius lived during the 
period of Spring and Autumn (770-476 B.C.), it is known that his family had lost its 
noble position, and had moved to the state of Lü, before Confucius was born. Hence, he 
was poor as an out-of-wedlock boy, but he studied hard, and became a scholar (ru 儒). 
Afterward, he served briefly as a minister in the state of Lü, and founded the Ru School 
Rujia 儒家 (the Confucian school). Later, he was forced into exile and started traveling 
and teaching all over China, where he became the first teacher in China to have a vast 
number of students and adepts. 
After Confucius himself, other great thinkers contributed to the evolution of 
Confucianism, adding new components to the basic beliefs imparted from the master; the 
two most famous of those were Mencius and Xunzi, who are respectively recognized as 
                                                
9 Watson, Burton, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 79. 
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 the idealistic wing and the realistic wing of the Confucian school; the first with his 
main idea of the goodness of the human nature, and the second with his belief in the 
evilness of all the human beings.  
Scholars have defined this Confucian ides as the Confucian Consensus. This 
consensus has been summarized in seven main points:  
 
1. Universe and human beings are governed by the Heaven (tian 天), which 
is ungovernable and not anthropomorphic. 
2. Heaven desires for men to be happy and conform to the cosmic harmony 
(dao 道). 
3. The finest contribution that men can bring to the cosmic harmony is to 
conduct an ethical and virtuous life. 
4. The proper behavior (li 礼) is the direct manifestation of the virtue (de 德). 
5. The ruler has to make hard choices before troublesome situations; he has 
to pick the right value in order to be a good leader. 
6. To understand the li 礼 to follow, it is important to learn the teaching of 
the sages of the past, and it is necessary to study hard through the lessons 
of history and nurture oneself through serious and constant efforts. 
7. Every human being is potentially a sage; hence, society is potentially 
harmonious and enjoyable for all.10 
                                                
10 Hucker, Charles, O., China’s Imperial Past, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1975), pp. 83-84. 
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There is a fundamental point of the Confucian doctrine that is missing from the 
list of the Confucian Consensus. That is, the basic element to actually reach harmony is 
the ethical concept of familiar relationships. Relationships are divided in five main 
interactions, which have reciprocal value. They are the relationships between ruler and 
subject, father and son, younger brother and elder brother, husband and wife, and finally 
friend and friend. What is controlling these relations is the proper behavior (li 礼) listed 
number four in the seven points of the Confucian Consensus. In other words, the 
Confucian principle of a “superior man” capable of maintaining a highly moral behavior 
is what becomes the law. That is, a harmonious society is the result of the application of 
the moral virtue through the li. Li is what every man needs to cultivate in himself to 
contribute to the realization of a well-ordered society. This is possible because every 
member of the society is identified with a specific role, which divides each person rank 
and duty from another (process called “Rectification of Names”) in a structured, “heaven-
given,” and permanent way, much like parenthood. Through this process each one is 
expected to do exactly what his own role dictates him to do, nothing more or less and this 
in the Confucian ideology, is the secret to prevent disorder and turmoil. Li becomes a sort 
of law of nature that orders and organizes the society.   
These Confucian values have been taught in China throughout the ages, publicly 
or just inside the family context. It did not become a state-sanctioned sole doctrine of 
political system, however, until the 1st century AD during the Han Dynasty. It can be said 
that these values are very much inherent to the Chinese society and, even with 
censorships during the Chinese revolutions since 1911, they are still very much in place 
14 
 in the 21st century. The ideas that emphasize the role of the family and structured 
relations based on the respect of filial piety are still influencing strongly many Chinese 
today.  
Such an ethical concept of relationships has nourished the formation of political 
rules and norms throughout the centuries. Built on the basic concept of individual 
morality and good will of each human being, the laws that developed from Confucian 
ideas are linked to the role of the society in reforming and persuading people in acting 
morally and in obedience to morality. Criminals are the outcome of the mistakes of the 
whole society, all its institutions and their lack of right teaching against the wrongdoers. 
In sum, individual virtues such as humanity, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are 
what a society needs to cultivate through education and punishment to create order and 
harmony; once the ruler possesses these four fundamental qualities the society will 
consequently be prosperous. 
Confucianism became the official philosophy endorsed by many imperial rulers 
since Emperor Han Wudi , who ruled from 141 B.C. until 87 B.C. The Confucian ideal of 
aspiration to self-perfection, to create a wealthy and structured society, was the 
ideological façade that emperors used to legitimate their power throughout the centuries. 
However, it is impossible to believe that natural laws and good intentions could keep the 
Chinese empire united for so long. The absence of a legal system, which would take care 
of the oppositions, of the enemies, and the criminal is only apparent. A clarification will 
be given shortly, when we will discuss the Legalist school. In the meanwhile, lets keep in 
mind the romantic idea of the virtuous and uncorrupted ruler that goes as far as leaving 
his position, whenever his job would be judged morally inappropriate. This scheme has 
15 
 been a genial method, used by Chinese leaders, to legitimate authority and supremacy 
since the second century B.C. 
 
Daoism 
Daoism developed during the period of the Warring States, and one of its main 
beliefs is that the difficulties of public life need to be avoided. It has been the only 
indigenous Chinese school of thought that reached the status of a major religion. Unlike 
many other major religions in the world, Daoism does not have much political influence 
on the Chinese state. Therefore, even though the Chinese imported and created various 
sophisticated belief systems, none of them really served as a state religion, hence the 
religious impact on Chinese politics has been weak and Chinese view of political 
authority and “world order” has not been put in any particular religious context, other 
than the previously discussed, rather secular “heaven-man-earth” framework.11 
Daoism comes from the word dao 道 and it is translated as “the way”. It is more 
of an individualistic and poetic description of the relation with nature; therefore, it has 
not much to contribute to the understanding of the governmental agendas, which the 
Daoists refused to take into consideration.12 However, it is important to be familiar with 
Daoism precisely for the indifference that the political power has showed toward it 
throughout the centuries. That is, Daoism political teachings were not the sine-qua-non 
                                                
11 Fung, Yu-lan, A short history of Chinese Philosophy, (England: Macmillan Publishing, 
1948). 
12 Fung, Yu-lan, A short history of Chinese Philosophy, (England: Macmillan Publishing, 
1948). 
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 for the stability of the empire, rather the opposite. In fact, Daoism’s detachment from 
political life and Daoism sort of individualism, were considered disruptive beliefs for 
building a harmonious society reliant of family and king-servant relations. To better 
understand the values advocated by this philosophy, I will quote a section of the main 
book of the Daoism, the Dao De Jing, titled “Inaction”: 
 
The follower of knowledge learns as much as he can every day; 
The follower of the Way forgets as much as he can every day. 
 
By attrition he reaches a state of inaction 
Wherein he does nothing, but nothing remains undone. 
 
To conquer the world, accomplish nothing; 
If you must accomplish something, 
The world remains beyond conquest.13 
 
Legalism 
The third important philosophy I want to examine is Legalism. In the famous 
book of the historian Sima Qian authored around 90 B.C., the Legalist school (fajia 法家) 
appeared, based on the teachings of the School of Legalist scholars. Legalist teachings 
can be synthesized as: emphasis on authority and order, importance of administrative 
techniques and sheer power, and the reliance on using law, force and manipulation of 
                                                
13 Laozi, “Inaction”, in Dao De Jing, Chapter 48, http://www.chinapage.com/gnl.html, 
accessed November 30, 2006.  
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 human weaknesses. More than a philosophy, Legalism can be interpreted as a set of 
instructions for rulers and ministers.  
The representative philosopher of Legalism is considered to be Han Fei Zi. Han 
Fei Zi’s dates are not certain, but in the book of Shi-Ji 史记 (also known as Records of 
the Historian) the author, Sima Qian (considered the first Chinese historian), writes that 
Han Fei Zi was probably a student under the eminent Confucian philosopher Xun Zi. At 
this point, I will take a look at Xun Zi to illustrate and stress Han Fei’s central arguments 
and ideas, especially those that are in resemblance with his teacher.  
 
Xun Zi 
Xun Zi was a Confucian philosopher who distinguished himself for his 
interpretation of human nature. He has been identified as the realist soul of the Confucian 
school. Xun Zi considered human nature inherently evil. However, he thought, as 
Mencius also believed, that by the righteous and proper use of culture, the nature of man 
can be domesticated. In an interesting quote from the tenth of the 32 chapters that form 
his work, Xun Zi writes:  
 
Man’s strength is not equal to that of the ox; his running is not equal to that of the horse; 
and yet ox and horse are used by him. How is this? I say that it is because men are able to 
form social organizations, whereas the others are unable… When united, men have 
18 
 greater strength; having greater strength, they become powerful; being powerful, they can 
overcome other creatures. (Chapter 10)14 
 
Nevertheless, Xun Zi differentiated himself from Mencius, since the solution he 
offered to the issue of order and harmony in the world, is based upon the institution of 
social organization with the necessity of rules of conduct not only based on moral and 
ethic teaching. Xun Zi pushed his position to the extent of stressing the importance of 
rules and laws. For instance, when Xun Zi discusses the notorious Confucian argument of 
the Rectification of Names, he uses a utilitarian approach. He explicitly makes clear that 
names are not heavenly given, but are assigned by conventions, and explains that rulers 
and their governments should determine meanings and functions, and should do this by 
the application of fix rules. Xun Zi’s student, Han Fei Zi, departing from this 
fundamental contribution, developed his own theory, which later became the focal point 
of the Legalist school. 
 
Han Fei Zi 
Han Fei Zi was of noble origins, connected with the royal family of Han. 
Throughout all his life he had to fight against his noble birth. Han Fei Zi wrote a book 
explaining his ideas on power and governance and the importance of laws and rules. The 
contents of the book pleased the King of the state of Qin that soon was to become the first 
Chinese emperor, and who had invited Han Fei Zi to go to his court. However, one of the 
                                                
14 Fung, Yu-lan , A short history of Chinese Philosophy, (England: Macmillan Publishing, 
1948). 
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 ministers of the king of Qin, Li Si, who knew Han Fei Zi from the time they were both 
students of Xun Zi, admonished the king that because Han Fei Zi was born in the Han 
royal family would never be completely devoted to his kingdom. For this reason, Han Fei 
Zi was poisoned and died without even being able of communicate his theories to the 
emperor.15  
As I said before, Han Fei Zi had studied with Xun Zi. Han Fei Zi stretched his 
teacher’s idea of the intrinsic evil nature of human being to the point of declaring how 
fruitless could be to try to acculturate common people, while they still will want to get 
the wealth of other and for that behave horribly. According to Han Fei Zi, the ruler need 
to act only based on the notion of self-interest. Xun Zi’s view of human nature definitely 
contributed to add one more element to the distinction between Legalist philosophy and 
the moralist Confucian-Mencian ideals, which conveys that each man is potentially sage 
and can contribute to a better society. Furthermore, Legalists assert that power is all that 
matters, and just being sage cannot guarantee the achievement of authority over others. 
While Confucianism is interested in politics centered around ethics and logic and 
esthetics, Legalism focuses on the single and most important problem; that is, how to 
preserve, strengthen, and use the power of the state. 
Han Fei Zi was only one of the masterminds of Legalism; he improved a set of 
concepts coming from several other works that date back to the Zhou dynasty. One 
document that particularly influenced Han Fei Zi’s thoughts was the Book of Lord Shang, 
attributed to a statesman called Wei Yang (338 B.C.), who served as a high minister in 
                                                
15 Watson, Burton, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 1-2. 
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 the state of Qin. This book was famous to be concentrated almost exclusively on 
political science with Legalist characteristics or the art of rule as an authoritarian 
monarch. Lord Shang (also known as Shang Yang), in one part of his book clarified that: 
 
The ancient rulers fixed the standard of measures and weights as a continuous rule till 
today; without these standards, people would have to arbitrarily determine the light from 
heavy, and subjectively guess the short from the long; therefore, law is the standardized 
rule… Law is the authoritative force of the people, and the key of governing… A wise 
ruler must signify the rule by law, so to speak, and act according to law so that the 
country would expand, the army would be strong, and the ruler would be venerated. Rule 
by law is the fundamental to governing.16 
 
There is another book that had influenced Han Fei Zi’s thinking: the work of Shen 
Buhai, from where Han Fei Zi drawn the concept of shu. Shu can be translated as 
policies, strategies or tactics, methods, or art of governing, which the ruler applies by 
using power to force everyone to respect the laws that do not govern the rulers 
themselves, in order to control officials and all the people under his authority.  
The goal of the Legalist teaching was to use laws and harsh penalties to 
strengthen the central government and to establish effective and direct control over all 
territories, new conquered lands and all populations. Finally, it was to substitute the old 
aristocracy and feudal system with a loyal and reliable organization of bureaucrats all are 
                                                
16 Ren Xin, Tradition of the Law and Law of the Tradition: Law, State, and Social 
Control in China, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997). 
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 appointed by, hence obey the ruler. To reach this goal, it was important to restrain the 
formation of any kind of new ideas and alternative ways of life or autonomous social and 
political organizations that could endanger the realization of the ultimate aim. Everybody, 
especially scholars, were to be left in a state of unawareness and terror, while an 
elaborate set of laws were to be decided by the ruler, make circulate between his officials, 
and taught and explained by them to the uneducated population.17  
Moreover, there is one more important difference between Legalist and Confucian 
beliefs; that is, the respect and admiration for the past that is present in point six of the 
Confucian Consensus and is completely missing from any Legalist teaching. Actually, 
the Legalists elaborated a list of “Six Parasitic Functions” that could disrupt a prince’s 
authority and majesty, and against which it was necessary to fight and among those there 
was the care for the old ages.18 Amazingly, the “Six Parasitic Functions” reminding one 
of the notions of the communist government during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976): 
care for old age, unemployment, beauty, love, ambitions, and Confucian proper conduct. 
 
Confucianism coated with Legalism 
Legalism is the source of political pragmatism based on realism of power politics 
all the way to the era of Deng Xiaoping (1980s - 1990s), in which the predicaments were 
all directed toward what needed to be done, after having united China or the known 
                                                
17 Watson, Burton, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 9-10. 
18 Needham, Joseph and Colin A. Ronan, The Shorter Science and Civilisation in China, 
Vol. 1, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
22 
 “world”, to ensure the state to survive, be strong and prosper. The idea of unity already 
existed in Mencius’ thinking, where unity was seen as possessing moral value. However 
in Mencius it was a reaction to the insecurity of the contemporary conditions, it was more 
of a dreamed desire, than a political doctrine to be pursued in reality.19 With the Legalist 
philosophy, unity and power became the ultimate goal of a good sovereign. 
Rulers should not trust anyone, and cannot afford to be transparent to the 
subordinates. Instead, using harsh laws, which are man-made and are pure instrument of 
those in power, the ruler should manipulate the people to maintain power. 20 The Legalist 
concept of rule is peculiar and has many commonalities with the laws applied by the 
totalitarian regimes such as that of the Mao Zedong era’s PRC (1949-1976). Law (fa 法) 
was for legalists a set of fixed rules to which everyone in the state, except the ruler 
himself, was obliged to abide, or strict penalties would apply.  
It can be argued that the Confucian ideology is a source of the essences in the 
Chinese political tradition, while the Legalist philosophy constituted the hard core of 
China’s imperial political system. For example, the Legalists first introduced to the 
ancient Chinese society the idea of ruling by law rather than rule of law, and the judicial 
bureaucracy of Chinese empire was based on the Legalist philosophy that calls for law to 
be made and used by the ruler, not applying to the ruler in any ways. The use of sheer 
                                                
19 Loewe, Michael, “The Concept of Sovereignty,” in The Cambridge History of China 
Vol. 1, by Twitchett, Denis and Michael Loewe eds., (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).  
20 Hucker, Charles, O., China’s Imperial Past, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1975), pp. 94-95. 
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 force constitutes the foundation of a ruler’s power hence the effectiveness of his law; 
and the familiar political ideology of Confucianism serves to help justifying the imperial 
enforcement of those laws. 
Therefore, it may appear paradoxical to see that every sovereign in China, until 
contemporary rulers in the PRC, has used Confucian ideals of harmonious society 
(“harmonious society” is the main philosophy predicated today by the current president 
of the People’s Republic of China, Hu Jintao) as a façade to obtain legitimacy for their 
acts that are essentially based on the use of power and manipulation. Ever since Qin, 
China’s rulers have always employed the calculated, cynical and often amoral legalist 
philosophy of realist power politics.  
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CHAPTER 2 
COMPARISON BETWEEN ROMAN AND CHINESE EMPIRES 
 
 
It is both interesting and provocative to draw a comparison between two of the 
most ancient and powerful empires ever existed: the Chinese Empire and the Roman 
Empire. The Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire, other than their similar 
achievements, share many similarities in the organizations of the two empires. However, 
there are clearly vast, significant dissimilarities between the two polities that are more 
evident and striking for our final intent. My purpose for pursuing this comparison is to 
help decipher what features of the two very different empires have had an impact on the 
development in the domestic and international organization of the different political 
systems of the West Europe and East Asia especially China. 
First of all, it is useful to lay out which is exactly the period of the comparison. 
Therefore, I will explain what was happening in China from the unification of the first 
empire, under Qin Shi Huangdi, until the end of the Late Han dynasty (221 B.C. – 220 
A.D). In the meantime, I will treat what was happening in Rome roughly during the same 
period. I will clarify this timeline in Figure 1., which represents the key points in the 
history of the two empires in comparison. The first graph represents the history of Rome, 
while the second depicts the major events of the history of China between the second 
century B.C. and the second century A.D. 
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 Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Chronology of the Roman and the Chinese Empire  
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 To summarize, after the unification of the Chinese Empire, occurred in 221 B.C. 
and guided by the first Chinese Emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, China experienced a type of 
political unity and continuity, which have been the key characteristic of the Chinese 
Empire throughout centuries, and until today. As we have acknowledged in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis, the consolidation of the unification of the Chinese Empire was based on a sort 
of compromise between the philosophy of the Legalists school and that of the Confucian 
school, occurred in Han, although the initial unification and creation of the Chinese 
Empire out of the ruins of the feudal states was mainly done through the use of sheer 
force as prescribed by the Legalists. On the other hand, Rome, in the two centuries before 
Christ (corresponding to Qin Shi Huandi’s reign and the early Han dynasty), saw the end 
of the republican period which was already a centralized and externally imperialistic 
power; while, during the two centuries after Christ was born (corresponding to the Late 
Han dynasty), Rome became a full-bloom empire, as the old republican constraints on the 
Roman Emperor’s central government was reduced to next to extinction. 
 In addition, to visualize the comparison, I have drawn the following Table 2., 
which summarizes the main features I have evaluated in both the Roman and the Chinese 
empires. I will systematically explain this Table and clarify the main points by outlining 









Table 2. Summary of the key features to be discussed in the following comparison 





The focus of the comparison is between 200 B.C. circa, until the years around 200 
A.D. I chose this fix timeframe because is the period of Chinese history that I will 
consider, which goes from the beginning of the Qin dynasty until the end of the Han 
dynasty. However, understanding the big picture of the history of Rome is mandatory to 
appreciate the time we are focusing on. I will here briefly discuss the three main phases 
in which Rome’s history has been divided, and see how Rome became an empire.  
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 The first phase of the history of Rome would be the Monarchic Phase, when the 
king was elected by the Senate and kept the power until his death. The king had political, 
judicial, military and religious power. The monarchic period was also the time when casts 
and aristocratic feudatories were becoming wealthier and wealthier, while the poorer in 
the society were more and more linked to the rich for the large amount of debts they had 
to face. That is, Rome was a society with clienteles and patronages. The monarchic phase 
started with the legendary date of the foundation of Rome, 753 B.C. and corresponds to 
the entire period of the famous seven kings of Rome – Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Tullus 
Hostilius, Ancus Mancius, Lucius Traquinius Priscus, Servius Tullius, Lucius Traquinius 
Superbus. According to the tradition, the last king wanted to institute an absolute and 
hereditary monarchy, but the Romans were opposed to this form of government and they 
proclaimed the republic. It was the year 509 B.C. 
Therefore, we enter in the second phase of Roman history: the Republican Phase, 
which would go from 509 B.C. until the foundation of the empire of Augustus (27 B.C.). 
During this time, the power was not in the hand of a king with life-long control; on the 
contrary, the Senate, formed by the nobles, was in power and the members of the Senate 
were electing two Consuls, each year, chosen from some patrician families -- this period 
of the republic is recognized as the ‘aristocratic republic’, because the only people that 
were admitted into the Senate were members of aristocratic families. The two Consuls 
and the Senate were the only sectors of the society allowed to make law; nevertheless, 
they did not have any religious power. The republican phase is also the period when the 
first military development occurred, with the establishment of army formed with 
professional soldiers; in addition, commercial exchanges also had started for the first 
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 time. The expansion of these two types of activities helped the lower classes to advance 
in the society and increase their social and political prestige. During this era the society 
started to open up; we see the passage from a society of casts to a society where private 
initiative and self-enrichment became source of wealth and power.  
The third phase is the Imperial Phase, which goes from the beginning of the reign 
of Octavian Augustus in 27 B.C. to the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 A.D. In 
this time, the concept of state as an amalgam of different regions developed. Every region 
started communicating within each other for commercial and cultural purposes. The 
imperial phase was the beginning of an organization of the world that can be defined the 
ancestor of modern capitalism. The specific periods of interest for the comparison in this 
chapter are segments of the last two phases, the republican and the imperial phase. 
 
Government organization 
 The most important point to remember is that, since the monarchic period, the 
positions and the functions attributed to the individuals in charge, either the king or the 
senators, were all assigned with and elective process. I will now examine the division of 
the main organ of the republican government, which was kept, after several revisions, 
also during the imperial government. The following detailed description of the 
organization of the state of Rome during the republican phase is crucial to being able 
later to jump to the period of major interest for us: the third phase. That is, the imperial 
phase of the history of ancient Rome. To summarize, the commander in chief of Rome 
has always been elected, even during the monarchic period (even though the election may 
had just a legitimization role – but nonetheless important in separating the Roman Empire 
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 from a Qin style empire). The role of the institutions was fundamental for the society, 
the various sectors of the society with time were all admitted in the Senate, which was the 
highest expression of decision-making power. Finally, since early phases of the republic, 
the emanation and the written record of laws was to express the equality of all the people 
in front of the law, and was to become the ancestor of those laws on which the Western 





Figure 2. Political Charges in Ancient Rome21 
                                                
21 Barberis, Carlo, Storia Antica e Medievale, (Milano: Edizioni Principato, 1997). 
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The Senate and the Magistratures 
 The Senate was the highest organ of the republican state. Many magistrates, who 
each covered different and specific roles, formed the Senate. There were two Consuls, 
who detained executive and military power. In other words, they applied the laws and in 
case of war they commanded the armies, but each one had the power only every other 
day. Below the Consuls there was the Praetor, who had judicial power; with time, the 
number of the Praetors increased. In addition, there was the role of Aediles and the 
Quaestors. Respectively, those who had to control the public order, the markets, the 
distribution of supply and the building and maintenance of public constructions; and 
those who had to take care of the financial problems and of the administration of the 
state’s treasury. Furthermore, there were the Censors. Censors were first elected every 
five years, but their time in office was to last only eighteen months. They had to calculate 
the citizens’ census for military and fiscal purposes. Later, when the legionaries became 
citizens and gained electoral power, this role became more and more important because 
they had the power to judge the morality of senators and politicians. A negative note 
could be lethal for their career. Finally, there were the Plebeian Tribunes, those who were 
interested in defending the position of the lower classes and could veto laws that would 
harm plebeians’ existence. All those were the ordinary Magistratures. Each one of those 
magistrates was responsible for the decisions he made, and in case of fault, he could not 
be persecuted until the end of his period of duty. However, his salary could be 
interrupted, whether a colleague had denounced him. Moreover, there were also 
extraordinary Magistratures, which would be applied only in emergency cases. The most 
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 important was the Dictatorship. The Dictator summoned absolute powers, both civil 
and military; however, this could last only for six months and could be instituted only in 
moment of profound crisis. 
Since all the functions of the Magistratures were temporary, the Senate acquired a 
position of crucial importance that was fundamental for the whole republican institutions. 
A prerogative of the Senate was the conduction of foreign affairs, and it also was the 
most important decision-maker in questions of annual budget and missions of conquest. 
In sum, all the aspects of roman public life – economics, politics, judicial, and military – 




 A decisive date for the plebeian class was the year 450 B.C., when for the first 
time laws were carved on bronze and exposed publicly in the Forum for everybody to be 
read and learned. The set of laws is known as the Law of the Twelve Tables (Lex 
Duodecim Tabularum), where for the first time the principle of equality in front the law 
and the principle of people’s sovereignty became official law. From that moment, the 
tradition of orally communicate laws was considered ended. Even though these tables 
were destroyed in 390 B.C., during the war Rome fought against the Gauls, many 
scholars have recorded excerpts of them in their historical writing (Cicero, Titus Livius, 
etc). Today, it is possible to identify in these twelve tables the official commencement of 
what is known as the Roman Law. The laws were written with a succinct style, and they 
were not comprehensive of all the laws necessary in each sector of the Roman society. 
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 The Tables were a sort of bill of rights, which became for centuries the readable and 
easy-to-memorize manifesto for the plebeian classes. For instance, by the publication of 
the Twelve Tables, the system of clienteles became official. That is, a patron was to have 
under his protection his own clients and if he damaged a client he would be considered 
forever cursed.22 
 For Rome, the Law of the Twelve Tables signed the concrete passage from the 
monarchic state, to the republican state. As I said before, previous to the Tables, Rome 
had already become a republic, but the power was concentrated only in the hands of 
aristocratic families, who could be part in the Senate. From now on, the Senate had the 
participation of plebeian representatives, and the duties covered by each member were 
exercised collegially and for limited time, to guarantee justice and integrity. 
 
Society  
 For the first part of the republican phase the power was completely held by the 
aristocratic class. The poorer classes were obliged to participate in the wars that the 
Senate was pursuing, even tough they were not included in the distribution of new 
conquered territories. While in war, they were also forced to leave their activities as 
farmers or craftsmen, which often resulted in exponentially increasing debts and risks of 
becoming slaves to pay off the debts. The situation was unsustainable for the plebeian 
classes and they started to rise up through social and political unrests. The results of the 
insurrections brought to the institution of a new function in the Senate. That is, two 
                                                
22 Barberis, Carlo, Storia Antica e Medievale, (Milano: Edizioni Principato, 1997). 
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 judges, the so-called Plebeian Tribunes, were recognized with an official role in the 
Senate. They had the power to veto laws that could damage the plebeian population,. 
 A crucial change in the society, which greatly influenced the passage from the 
republic to the empire, has been the position of the roman military forces, which had 
enormously increased their power since the application of the reform attributed to the 
notorious sixth king of Rome, Servius Tullius. This reform can be summarized as 
follows, the society was divided into six classes, and the presence in the army of each 
class was subjected to each class wealth (while before, it was just compulsory for 
everybody). Because of this defined division, each class needed to have its own 
representative in the government and its own right to discuss laws and policies; hence, 
each class gained electoral power.  
The six classes were: first class that of the cavalry, the second, and the third were 
both of the infantry (the difference between them was based on possessions and type of 
arms used in the field). The fourth class was that of auxiliary troupes; the fifth class was 
that of light-armed soldiers, and the sixth was the class of the proletarians. Of course, the 
first class had more political influence, and for this reason from this moment, the relation 
between politics and military increased in importance. Form now on the republic was 
identified as oligarchic, and not anymore as aristocratic.  
Table 3 represents the division of classes that formed the army. This is according 
to the tradition that wants the king Servius Tullius to be the first to promote this reform 
called of the Centuria – subdivision.23 Table 3 summarizes the type of armament each 
class was allowed to wear and what was the number of soldiers that each Centuria – 
                                                
23 Barberis, Carlo, Storia Antica e Medievale, (Milano: Edizioni Principato, 1997). 
35 
 subdivision, needed to provide once asked to go to war. The numbers in Table 3 should 
help identify the political power that each class had in the decision-making process, and 




Table 3. Division of classes to form the army 
 
In different governments later, other divisions were also applied, but these were 
mainly based on the location of the territorial possessions of each class. These divisions 
were called Tributes Assembly. The peculiarity was that in the Tributes Assembly, 
aristocrats and plebeians that were living in the same area could be reckoned together. 
These assemblies had the power of electing magistrates of lower ranks like Aediles or 
Quaestors, as Figure 3 shows.  
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 Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Various people’s assemblies and their electoral power.24 
  
 The internal division between classes was growing with time, and brought to the 
point where the stability of the state was weakened. Tribunes of the plebeians with time 
had managed to add to their veto power, the power of promoting new laws and reforms to 
alleviate the struggle of the lower classes. After the army reform, another group of people 
tried to get command and attention; that is, the group of the cavalry (populares, often 
supported by the proletarian). They were in contrast with the   promoter of the aristocrats 
and the plebeians that had become rich with commerce and other activities (optimates, 
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 supporter of the power of the Senate). Some important names characterized this period 
of political changes and fought for power between populares and optimates. The most 
important names will be those of Marius and Silla, whose influence led to the passage 
from the republic to the empire. The first was supported by the populares and the second 
was supported by the optimates. It became civil war between the two candidates  and 
their followers, and the conflict represented the crucial moment when extremely 
charismatic individuals made their appearance on the political scene of the republic of 
Rome and changed its destiny forever: Pompeus, Crassus and Caesar. 
 In this context it is worth to focus on the last person, who unquestionably shaped 
the momentum from the republic to the empire: Julius Caesar. Caesar used a political 
approach different from that of the statesmen of the previous periods. He did not 
surrender to personal vendetta; on the contrary, he tried to be known for his magnitude 
and his wide and popular consensus. To do so, he enlarged the number of participants to 
the Senate from 600 to 900, admitting also people from the provinces, previous slaves 
that had gained back their freedom through good services and people from the new 
conquered territories. Caesar cleverly treated with each class in the way they wanted to 
be treated; that is, involving the lower classes to the decision-making processes and 
reassuring the rich that their private properties would not be affected.  
 In the year 48 B.C. Caesar was proclaimed perpetual dictator and emperor for life. 
For this reason, many were unsatisfied with this nomination, illegal in a republic state and 
Caesar’s rivals organized a plot against him. On March 15 of the year 44 B.C. Caesar was 
stabbed 27 times in his chest. A fundamental change of Caesar’s dictatorship was the 
relation he had established with the people in the provinces. Caesar granted roman 
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 citizenship to many of the populations of the provinces and sped up the process of 
urbanization by building markets and cities in those areas, so that the new populations 
could feel to be part of Rome and contribute to his greatness. 
 
Foreign Affairs 
The power acquired by the military after the class reform gave to single generals 
of roman legions the authority of starting expeditions to new territories to achieve more 
power and wealth. Each new war was the expression and materialization of the internal 
struggle discussed above between classes or single individuals, which brought to the 
decay of the republic. Yet, one feature is worth mentioning in this context: the method 
utilized by the Romans in dealing with the new conquered territories. That is, 
Romanization by integration. 
While in the second century B.C. China had become a unitary empire under the 
command of the first emperor Qin Shi Huangdi, republican Rome was pursuing these 
expansionistic policies in Europe and elsewhere. Romans troupes had reached Spain, 
many of the territories on the Mediterranean Sea, and had also arrived as far as Northern 
Africa and the Middle East. All the conquered territories became property of the state 
(the so-called ager publicus). Many of these territories became Roman colonies with a 
twofold objective: first, they were used to assign agricultural land to citizens (in fact, the 
term ‘colony’ in Latin means to cultivate), and second, they were strategic locations for 
Roman armies. The dwellers of the colonies were almost always considered Roman 
citizens. 
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 To sum, the far-sighted policy the Romans applied to the new territories is 
sufficient to say that they gave to many of these populations the right to vote in the 
Roman Senate.  
 
Empire: the evolution 
 The death of Caesar was supposed to bring back the real values of the republic; 
instead the republican state appeared weakened by Caesar’s murder and sort of 
accelerated its process of decay. The faction who had killed Caesar hoped to get the 
support of the lower classes to start governing again; however, Caesar was well respected 
within the population. Hence, the party that sustained a renaissance of the republic lost all 
its power. It is in this environment that Octavian Augustus made his appearance in the 
political scene. He became the spokesmen for everybody who was tired of internal and 
personal conflicts and between factions, and tired of the indolence of the apparatus. Even 
tough the juridical functions of Augustus were illegal for the republican state, the reforms 
that took place helped confirm his person as the highest charge of the state. He kept the 
basic republican institutions, like the Senate and the Magistratures; however, he reduced 
the number of participants and maintained only those who would support him. Augustus 
was able to obtain the title of princeps, or first citizen of Rome, which is one of the titles 
that will determine the identity of the third phase of Roman history, the Principate. 
 Augustus obtained the title of princeps, which is used to stress the political 
character of Augustus power. Nevertheless, he had also different responsibilities, and the  
other name with which his historical phase is usually known, the Imperial Phase, is 
because of another of his duties. The title of imperator (emperor, from Latin: commander, 
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 victorious general) was the title that Augustus never renounced of. From Augustus 
ahead, every princeps also had the honorific title of imperator (emperor), and from here 
the definition of the imperial phase. In sum, Augustus de facto concentrated all the 
powers in his hands and instituted an empire, but without destroying the basic order of 
the republican state. In fact, he was an elected emperor. 
When Augustus died in the year 14 A.D., his son, Tiberius, who was elected 
emperor, kept his father de facto position of princeps-imperator. At this point in history, 
the Senate only had a nominative role. However, it is important to remember that was 
still an organ of the empire structure. The approach of Augustus to the best typology of 
government needed for Rome was similar to that of Caesar. That is, to always express 
major attention and respect for the republican institutions and all Roman traditions, as 
they represented the foundation of the greatness of Rome. 
 The period after Augustus death, between the reign of Nerva (96 A.D.) and the 
reign of Commodus (192 A.D.), called the time of the Nervan-Antonian dynasty, is 
recognized as the most prosperous and powerful epoch of the Roman empire. The 
emperors kept the approach that was proper of Augustus, always looking at the past as 
glorious example, and never underestimate the power of the lower classes and population 
of the provinces; on the contrary, continuously favoring those classes to avoid social 
struggle and the empowerment of too influential senators that could threaten the stability 
of the empire25. 
 
 
                                                
25 Barberis, Carlo, Storia Antica e Medievale, (Milano: Edizioni Principato, 1997). 
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   China 
 
Period 
The period of interest in the comparison goes from the unification of China under 
one ruler (221 B.C.) to the end of the Han Dynasty (220 A.D.). As we have described in 
the first chapter, in the period before the unification, known as the period of the Warring 
States, China was divided into many kingdoms fighting one another for supremacy. The 
autonomy reached by the single states in the decadent period of the Easter Zhou was lost 
with the promotion of a whole and unified China by King Ying Zheng. When King Ying 
Zheng, king of the state of Qin, managed to win over all the other warring states, he 
named himself Qin Shi Huangdi, literally means the first emperor, because his role was 
different from the role of any previous rulers and above those kings he had dethroned. He 
had initiated the conception of China transmitted through history for the following two 
millennia. That is, China became a centralized empire with a pyramidal and centralized 
structure.  
Qin Shi Huangdi had had several advantages, which allowed his kingdom to 
become the unifier of China. First of all, Qin’s territory covered a geographic position, 
part of today’s Shaanxi and Sichuan provinces, which resulted strategically beneficial. It 
was protected in the east part by mountains and gorges, and also had easy access to the 
north China plain and to the central Yellow River valley. This position made Qin 
invulnerable to attacks, but favored Qin’s intrusions in other kingdoms. Second, in the 
northern part, the kingdom was also sided by territories where non-Chinese tribes were 
living; for this reason, the army of Qin was used to combat against them, habits that made 
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 the Qin’s army strong and prepared for violent wars. Third, the favorable geographic 
location also helped the economy of Qin because its territories were in the most fertile 
area of China, and they were also rich of minerals and lumber. Fourth, because of its 
economic advantages Qin was attractive for many immigrants looking for better life26. 
Finally, because the king of Qin was renowned for his aggressive politics, his kingdom 
became very attractive for brilliant administrators in search of power and responsibility, 
as it was in the case of Li Su, who became the first counselor of Qinshi Huangdi (some 
scholars believed him to be the true deus ex machina of the Qin triumph)27. 
 
Figure 4. 
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1975). 
27 Bodde, Derk, China’s First Unifier, A Study of the Ch’in Dynasty as seen in the Life of 





Figure 4. China during the Period of the Warring States28 
 
Government organization 
The organization of the government from the first Chinese empire (founded in 
221 B.C.) was basically maintained the same also during the Han dynasty. The key point 
is the pyramidal structure of the government, which can be broadly divided into central 
government and provincial government (as it is also today). The emperor, who is the 
unique basis of authority and leadership, holds the highest position in the central 
government. As we have discussed before, since the first unifier, Qin Shi Huangdi, the 
                                                




 power of the emperor was legitimized by the idea that supremacy was assigned to the 
emperor by the non-earthly authority recognized with Heaven. This belief authorized the 
emperor to ask for the absolute obedience and loyalty of every individual below him in 
the social structure; that is, everybody in the whole empire.  
The unification advanced by the first emperor was not Qin Shi Huangdi’s only 
contribution. The set of reforms that he promoted was what radically changed China’s 
history. He promoted the new system of centralized administration and cultural 
unification, characteristics still in use in contemporary China. The emperor believed that 
the sort of autonomy that states acquired during the Eastern Zhou had been a political 
disaster. For this reason, the most important change he made was aimed at the 
fragmentation of the territories of local aristocratic families. Since this moment, at a 
father’s death, the territory could not go only to the primogenital son, but it was to be 
divided between all the sons. The result was a great fragmentation of even the biggest 
territories, to avoid that any of these smaller states could rise up against the central 
government. 
Moreover, the empire was divided into thirty-six commanderies, each subdivided 
into counties. Each commandery had a civil governor, a military commander and an 
imperial inspector. They were all centrally appointed and earned fixed salaries. The real 
reform to stress here is the refusal of Qinshi Huangdi to support any policy that would 
mean going back to any kind of separate power and old feudalistic structures. From now 
on the Chinese empire will have a uniformly centralized jurisdiction. The commanderies 
of the past are today’s provinces (sheng 省) and counties (xian 县). The cultural 
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 unification was pursued primarily through the standardization of written language, 
currency, weights and measures, and legal code.29 
The central government possessed the highest power and had a tripartite structure, 
mainly maintained also in the Han period, in which the emperor was at the apex. Directly 
below him there were the three dukes (sangong) responsible for the various sections of 
the whole empire. On the other hand, nine dignitaries directed the administration of the 
imperial reality. Their tasks were to administrate the ceremonies, palace treasury, 
imperial guards, and the administration of the capital.  
An approximate representation of the structure of the empire is illustrated by the 
following figure, which should help visualize the pyramidal shape of the structure of the 
Chinese first empire, and of those that followed. 
 
Figure 5. 
                                                
29 Bodde, Derk, “The State and Empire of Ch’in,” in The Cambridge History of China 
Vol. 1, by Twitchett, Denis and Michael Loewe eds., (New York: Cambridge University 






Figure 5. Structure of the State during Qin Dynasty30 
 
The administration of the Han dynasty, especially under the time of the emperor 
Wudi (140 B.C. – 9 A.D.), changed the role of the Grand Counselor, who was sort of 
deprived of part of his authority. It was instituted a Secretariat, directly dependent from 
the emperor, which had one director, one vice-director and six other members, each 
responsible for a specific section (cao). In addition, the role of the nine dignitaries 
changed a little bit. Before they were mostly responsible for the facts of the imperial 
house, while from the Han time, they achieved major power and became responsible for 
                                                




 nine actual ministries: rites, treasury, agriculture and taxation, imperial guards, tributary 
relations, imperial family, justice, imperial stables, and court ceremonies. Moreover, the 
tasks of the Grand Censor went under the power of an inspector, directly dependent from 
the emperor. Lastly, to districts and commanderies were added small reigns and 
marquisates, also under the direct control of the imperial family.  
The nominations for each one of these roles were supposedly based on merit; 
however census, familiar connections and a complicated system of recommendations was 
the foundation of the Chinese bureaucracy. To better shape the perfect functionary, the 
Han emperor Wudi created the Imperial University, which had the goal of educating the 
next generation of bureaucrats with solid ideals of the meaning of centralization and 
capacity to preserve the imperial authority. 
 
Laws 
Previous to the Qin Empire, we find three different codes of laws, which included 
fix and public law. One was of the state of Qin and was inscribed on bronze in the year 
513 B.C.31 The core content of the code regarded just criminal law, but in any case it was 
utilized by the successors as the foundation for the later development of Legalist 
philosophy. The Legalist’s thought prospered before the unification of China, and was 
endorsed by Qin Shi Huangdi, who unified China with it. Legalism nurtured a culture of 
authority through fear, in order to strengthen the power of the state. As a consequence, 
laws were for the government mere instruments to keep absolute control. Law was 
                                                
31 Bodde, Derk, China’s First Unifier, A Study of the Ch’in Dynasty as seen in the Life of 
Li SSu, (Philadelphia: Hong Kong University Press, 1967). 
48 
 established to serve the state and was not meant to serve the people, who also had no 
voice in the making of the laws.  
The essence of the laws during the Qin period, which was relatively kept during 
the time of the Han dynasty, was as follows. According to the evil nature of the human 
being, which seeks only personal advantage and act based on self-interests, there is only 
one resolution that can stop them from misbehaving: the concern of being severely 
punished 32. Hence, with the Qin dynasty the desire for rewards and the fear of 
punishment became the only solution capable of obtaining people to lean toward good. 
When the Han dynasty gained power, the openly cruel Legalist philosophy of the 
previous period, sort of melted back with the basic beliefs of the Confucian teachings of 
Xunzi, according to which the evil part of the human being can be rectified through 
education. In a passage of the Shi Ji, Sima Qian writes that: 
 
After the establishment of the Han Dynasty, the government abolished all cruel laws, 
eliminating those that were superficial but maintaining those that were basic and 
essential. The law was so lenient that it could be compared to a fishing net with huge 
holes through which the largest fish could easily escape. Yet the government functioned 
better and better each day, and there were no dishonest dealings among government 
officials. Meanwhile people enjoyed peace and security. It seems clear that the best way 
to govern lies in the cultivation of virtues rather than imposition of harsh punishment.33 
                                                
32 Bodde, Derk, China’s First Unifier, A Study of the Ch’in Dynasty as seen in the Life of 
Li SSu, (Philadelphia: Hong Kong University Press, 1967). 




Nevertheless, it is very hard to believe that Sima Qian would not be influenced by 
imperial pressure when writing such sentences, or that his work was not retouched in 
later periods, since we know that he was condemned to castration for having made a 
positive remark about a man accused of being a villain by the Chinese imperial law.  
What is more likely is that government officials would use the same rhetoric used 
by Sima Qian in the passage above, to promote their power, but once reached the position 
of officials, they would heartlessly participate in inhumane persecutions and enforcement 
of laws, being that the easiest and safest way to secure their authority. In sum, the legalist 
philosophy after the end of the Qin dynasty was modified exteriorly, in order to be more 
acceptable and humane. Confucianism, with its ideas of attentions to customs and 
personal judgment apparently replaced the crude legalist set of laws. In practice, legal 
processes were not systematized, but left to arbitration within clan and villages, where 
power and wealth always acted as ultimate ruler.  
 
Society 
The main set of values that openly persisted, and evolved in the long period of 
following dynasties is Confucianism. China is defined as a Confucian society. This label 
is to summarize the imprint of the society based on the Confucian idea of harmony. 
Harmony in the Confucian teaching has to be preserved by observing certain reciprocal 
relationships and responsibilities. Confucius established an ethical and moral system that 
governs all relations. The family was the basic unit of society. There are five great 
relationships: kindness in the father and obedient devotion in the son, gentility in the 
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 eldest brother and humility and respect in the younger, righteous behavior in the 
husband and obedience in the wife, humane consideration in elders and deference in 
juniors, and benevolence in rulers and loyalty of ministers and subjects. A specific 
hierarchy is observed that places highest importance on rank and age in all interactions.  
This basic concept of family is what Qin Shi Huangdi, the first emperor of China, 
wanted to exploit when he tried to fragment the society into small family nucleuses. He 
wished to avoid that any family other than the imperial family could never become strong 
enough to oppose his reign to his own. However, the family structure had become already 
an intrinsic feature of the Chinese society and Qin Shi Huangdi did not manage to 
diminish the significance of family relations and did not stop oppositions to his reign.  
In the society there were two certainties, one linked to the other, the family 
structure was unmistakable and the emperor was above everything, especially laws. At 
this point, we can consider the more “secular” arrangement of the society. Chinese 
society was basically divided into those who took part in the administration of the central 
government and those who did not. As we have explored in the structure of the empire, 
there were senior officials close to the emperor and minor officials for different 
ministries. Moreover, there were the categories of officials who acted in the provinces. 
Each official had a rank that was differentiated with ribbons of different color (gold, 
silver, bronze etc.)34  
The differences in the society were not only based on census. This is proved by 
the position occupied by the merchants. They covered the lowest position in the society, 
                                                
34 Loewe, Michael, Everyday Life in Early Imperial China, During the Han Period 202 
BC – AD 220, (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1968), pp. 29 – 53.  
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 even when circulation of money and commerce had given them great opportunity of 
becoming wealthy. The real rich were those who could buy land, and not just trade 
commodities, because land was considered the true luxury.  
Between the merchants and the officials there were the non-officials, which in 
quantity were way more numerous than the officials, but had a much lower status in the 
society, almost inexistent. The only bond for these outsiders remained the family 
relationships. Those were the small landholder, the peasants and farmer working under 
large estate owners, or laborers.  
Since imperial government was based on the concept of rewarding exemplary 
services, while punishing those that were unfavorable for the empire, each reward 
became standardized. There were twenty types of order, and the non-officials could reach 
only until the eighth degree. The higher degree was that of the ‘marquis’ and it was 
hereditary. The absolute lower section of the society was that occupied by the slaves. 
Slaves were never more than one per cent of the population35, they were used for a 
multitude of employments, but they could not ameliorate their rank in the society. 
Finally, everybody in the twenty-layers-order were obliged to give one year 
service to imperial labor or imperial military force. In theory this obligation was to last 
for one year, but if the war lasted longer, they could not leave their duty. The military 
service was mandatory for every one submitted to the authority of the emperor; however, 
official functionaries were exonerated.  
 
                                                
35 Loewe, Michael, Everyday Life in Early Imperial China, During the Han Period 202 
BC – AD 220, (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1968), pp. 58 – 60.  
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 Foreign Affairs 
The name of China in Chinese (Zhongguo 中国) means ‘middle kingdom’. It is 
not a coincidence that historically, the Chinese thought of their civilization as the center 
of the refined world. In fact, they defined ‘barbarous’ all the population occupying 
territories not under the control of the Chinese empire. Pye synthesizes brilliantly this 
Chinese millenary self-recognition: “Without undue exaggeration it can be said that an 
awareness of the greatness of Chinese civilization, together with an appreciation of the 
distinctiveness of “Chineseness,” is possibly one of the few cognitions shared by nearly 
the entire human race.”36 
When the emperor Wudi of Han conquered the territory of the modern China and 
also arrived to Vietnam, Mongolia, Machuria and Korea instituted a diplomatic organism 
that is known as tributary system. The rulers of the occupied territories could maintain 
their authority, as long as they admitted to cover an inferior position in respect to the 
Chinese empire. These territories would become China’s vassals, would offer homage 
each year to the Chinese emperor, by sending a delegation to the capital with every sort 
of local product and sumptuous gifts. 
 
Empire: the evolution 
The organization of the government from the first Chinese empire (founded in 
221 B.C.) was basically maintained as the same also during the Han dynasty. The key 
point to understand is the pyramidal structure of the government, which can be broadly 
                                                
36 Pye, Lucian, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992), pp. 50 – 53.  
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 divided into central government and provincial government (as it is also today). The 
emperor, who is the unique basis of authority and leadership, holds the highest position in 
the central government. As we have discussed before, since the first unifier, Qinshi 
Huangdi, the power of the emperor was legitimized by the idea that supremacy was 
assigned to the emperor by the non-earthly authority recognized with Heaven. This belief 
authorized the emperor to ask for the absolute obedience and loyalty of every individual 
below him in the social structure; that is, everybody in the whole empire. Nevertheless, 
there is one thing to be noted, each dynasty in China started as the result of a civil war or 
foreign invasions, and the emperor was always a single winner that eliminated the others 
and resisted. Actually, it was with the founder of the Han dynasty, Liu Bang, considered 
of poor origins and without education, that the role of the ‘mandate of heaven’ was 
formally conferred (202 B.C.)37. 
The imperial system became increasingly more sophisticated in the following 
eras, from the Han Dynasty  (206 B.C. – A.D. 220) to the Tang Dynasty (唐代 618 – 907 
A.D.). Throughout the dynasties, the Legalist concept of rule by law (opposite to the 
western idea of rule of law) became the means of statecraft par excellence. Early 
Confucians had criticized rule by law, proposing the achievement of harmony between 
the society and the will of Heaven by adherence to ethical principles. The structural 
complexity reached by the Chinese empire in the centuries following the formation of the 
first empire saw even Confucian officials working on the codification of precise laws. 
Confucians permeated laws with Confucian philosophy. For this reason, the original 
                                                
37 Loewe, Michael, Everyday Life in Early Imperial China, During the Han Period 202 
B.C. – A.D. 220, (London: Batsford, 1968). 
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 equality typical of the Legalist concept of law went lost through the application of the 
law according to the grade of relationships between the parties, i.e., it was considered a 
terrible offense when a son murdered a father, but the opposite was not true.38 
 
  Conclusive remarks 
  
 The comparison of the two empires showed us that in many features the two 
empires had different organization. To conclude this section it is worth mentioning four 
of the most eloquent of these dissimilarities, which I extrapolated from four of the 
features that I have analyzed in each empire. That is, government organization, laws, 
society and foreign affairs. Each one of these distinction resulted in a peculiar 
characteristic inherited by the Western modern society and Chinese contemporary 
societies and their political settings. I acknowledge the undeniable existence of nuances 
that can be opposed to the following discussion; for this reason, I intend to make clear 
that the comparison is made through a wide generalization of the results of this research. 
 First, talking about government organization, the major distinction is that the 
electoral system has always been at the foundation of Roman political world, even when 
the organization was mainly monarchic or imperial. In China, on the other hand, there has 
never been an election, but power and authority has always been determined mostly 
through family relations, even tough a meritocratic system was present.  
                                                
38 Hucker, Charles, O., China’s Imperial Past, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1975), pp. 149 – 164. 
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  Second, the set of laws that Rome instituted with the Law of the Twelve Table 
and developed throughout the centuries was expression of requests from every section of 
the society. Because of the electoral representation that each class could enjoy, the laws 
were stipulated to make (at least in theory) everybody equal before the law. The western 
concept of law evolved from these prerequisites. It is not a coincidence that with the 
expression of Roman Law, in a broader sense, we indicate the judicial system developed 
in Europe all the way through the 18th century. Chinese laws were coded to serve the state 
and not the people; for this reason, still today it is difficult to discern a systematic and 
efficient Chinese judicial system. As we have seen, most of the cases were and has been 
decided on the base of personal judgments and personal relations. 
 Third, the society of Rome was extremely flexible. Plebeian could become rich 
and live close to the nobles; slaves could serve honestly and be awarded with freedom 
and could be given the chance of advancing in the society. In China the ranks were 
almost immobile and the levels in the society were to be firm and respected until death. 
From here resulted the extreme power of the classes in command. 
 Fourth, regarding the relation with foreigner, Rome integrated and helped 
developing the population of the new territories, granting citizenship and respecting 
customs; in exchange, the new territories were subjected to the same laws and the same 
rules of all the other Romans. China never assimilated the new population without 
changing their deep cultural aspects. China always maintained the pride of being The 
civilization, always imposing its Chineseness to everything it could. This Chineseness is 
also possible to be characterized as that set of institutions, norms and values created 
during the Qin dynasty; the same imposition of Chineseness happened also to the 
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 Western ideas of socialist revolution through the well-known model Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
THE P.R.C. ERA 
 
 
The concept of authority in China 
 
All the way through this work, we have tried to assert the intrinsic relation that 
each individual has with higher authority in the Chinese civilization, since the creation of 
the first empire and the Qin system; being the higher authority means a father, a husband, 
a government official, or the emperor in person. These relations are fixed within a 
conduct that requires total respect and fear; all this was not only possible because of 
Confucian social structures, but was also legitimized and systematized through the 
legalist use of force, and after marked as a sign of the uniqueness of China. This result 
was achievable because of, nominally, the postulate that the highest goal was the 
harmony and the peace of the whole world.  But the foundation for such centralized 
power relationship rests more on the skilled use of force and the monopoly of resources 
in the hands of the top ruler, the emperor. 
This tremendously clever mechanism, spread bottom up in the Chinese society, is 
applied by Lucian Pye to evaluate the Chinese perception of authority and evaluate the 
reasons behind the modern application of it. We will use his approach to clarify today’s 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) power. In his book The Spirit of Chinese Politics, 
Lucian Pye describes the traditional Chinese family structure, attributing to it great 
influence in the socialization of the whole nation. Pye investigates how the modernization 
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 process has changed Chinese peoples’ relations with government and policy. Pye 
touches three important points: the family structure, the Confucian accent on shame, from 
where the whole Chinese civilization has been also identified as a culture of shame, and 
the need for a strong authority. I consider the first two points as the foundation for the 
third point; they lead to the explication of the need for a strong authority, justified only in 
an entirely Chinese context, and still applicable today. 
The first point is the traditional family structure, which embeds the strong value 
of filial piety. For centuries this value has compelled Chinese to accommodate dutifully 
the rough treatments of authoritarian fathers. The child could not act against the authority 
of the father; hence, because of the patriarchal structure of the family, the child could not 
act against the authority of the whole family. The Confucian concept of shame was 
crucial in the education of the children. A Chinese child should prefer to suffer silently, 
not interfering with the teaching of the family, because the fear to feel humiliated for the 
errors he could commit, was worse than any will to make his own ego prevail39.  
As mentioned before, Pye’s second point is the use of the sense of shame. The 
horror of shame is veiled, but omnipresent in family relations. This diffuse attitude of 
shame has formed the character of the Chinese people toward all authorities, paternal, 
family, and government. Confucianism wants relations between people to be well 
designed and strictly immobile. If the proper, virtuous, filial relations were respected, 
there would be harmony in the world. The respect for the authority is as strong as the 
result of any Chinese being able to accept the authority’s will and decision, even when it 
                                                
39 Pye,  Lucian,  The  Spirit  of  Chinese  Politics. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), p.  74. 
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 seems unfair and unjustified. This has shaped in China the powerful belief that self-
cultivation, along with the cultural ideal of harmony, is extremely efficacious, to the 
extent that self-cultivation and moral control become virtues. Control of emotions, ability 
to act in perfect harmony with the fixed set of rules, and in separation from the 
sentiments that usually bring shame, is the right way to contribute to stability.  
The third point expressed in Pye’s book describes the need for authority. Strictly 
related to the previous two arguments, the need for authority is explained as a 
consequence of the hierarchical family structure, and the fear of shame. From this sense 
of shame Chinese should derive self-control, and this self-control is fundamental to 
maintain harmony within the structure. Nevertheless, the authoritarian father is also a 
paternalistic figure, and this perception toward the father leads the Chinese people to the 
expectation of a similar relation with the government. According to Pye, self-control is 
complemented with the awareness that if self-control were not to work, there should still 
be a strong external authority capable of imposing discipline, thus bringing everything 
back to harmony. This concept is expressed by the Chinese conscious demand for a 
competent and effective authority. In sum, the main idea is that if the system breaks, and 
harmony is compromised, only establishing new form of authority, for the sake of 
harmony and stability, could stop the raise of any kind of rebellion or aggression.40 
To the significant three points treated by Pye, I would add an essential 
characteristic that seems only implied in Pye’s whole argument. That is, the role 
Legalism played in the building of the relations with power and authority. I believe the 
                                                
40 Kallgren, Joyce, “The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Review”, The American Political 
Science Review 3  (1969):  930-931. 
60 
 sense of shame has been promoted especially through the fear of being punished. 
Otherwise, the following sentence of Confucius would be the sole and optimal 
representation of the ties with power, and the toughness of the Qin system would reveal 
itself weak and ineffective. Confucius says: “If laws led the people, and uniformity 
sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have 
no sense of shame. If they were led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by 
the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become 
good”.41 This ideology became the spoken virtue behind the actualization of the system 
of punishment and rewards toward the centuries, and the aware or unaware compliance of 
the people with this system. 
After discussing the need for authority, Pye explains a crisis of authority in the 
transition period from the end of the Empire, passing by the rise to power of the 
Communist Party to the Cultural Revolution. He describes the end of the Qing Empire as 
a period troubled with instability, caused by the lack of a powerful government, and a 
tremendous need to stabilize the command of the country. The period is identified as the 
transition to modernization, whereas modernization is seen as a direct challenge from the 
West to Chinese authority. The short passage throughout the ineffective democratic 
regime, from 1911 to 1916, showed China its own backwardness. The following attempts, 
directed by the national authority, to reach modernization, went to affect the strong power 
                                                
41 Chan, Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1963). 
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 of the local authority. This caused discontent at the local level, carrying also a sort of 
de-legitimization of the already weak central power, and a serious vacuum of authority.42  
In the Confucian setting of the world, the harmony has to be maintained at every 
level of personal relationship. For this reason, if one of the links is loosening, or missing, 
there is right for revolution and disorder. In addition to Pye’s interpretation of the 
Confucian missing link that creates chaos, I believe it is vital to remember how each 
dynasty started, under what circumstances, and based on what type of behavior. That is, 
was it based on the behavior of virtuous, self-educated, Confucian men or built on plots, 
pragmatic murders, meditated eliminations and pursue of absolute power? Chinese 
historiography likes to tell us that each new dynastic cycle started based on the will of 
Heaven, that non-earthy and wise entity that has shaped Chinese political characteristics 
since the mythological emperors.43 Yet, the practical act of elimination of the old guard, 
the official investiture and the justification of the whole process could not be in place 
without that supreme power and strength that legal measures had offered to each new 
commander of imperial families. 
Finally, Pye argues that only with the advent of the Communists was the vacuum 
of authority, at the beginning of the 20th century, completely filled. Under the 
Communist regime societal behavior was apparently modified, since the new regime 
seems to grant the new generations, once reached their adulthood, opportunities to 
express their dissents and their rage. However, I deem important to stress that Chinese 
                                                
42 Pye, Lucian, The Spirit of Chinese Politics. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), p. 72. 
43 Bertuccioli, Giuliano, La Letteratura Cinese, (Milano: Sansoni, 1968). 
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 children are still taught to control their emotions when facing their parents, and to fear 
the shame whether disobeying. For this reason, I accept the definition of vacuum of 
authority replaced with the authority of the CCP, but what I judge crucial is the fact that 
the procedure to get to the New Chinese Empire, the Socialist Empire, did not differ 
much from ancient dynastic revolution; that is, death, uprising, unclear appointment of 
new power, and harsh clutch over ordinary people.  
 
Two eras in the mirror 
 
This section is a practical exercise to clarify to what extent the revolution of the 
CCP has only been a façade transformation, built on a structure that dreadfully resemble 
that of the ancient empire. It is also possible to disentangle similarities that appear like a 
humorous trick of nature. However, in substance, China allows them to occur because of 
the astonishingly robust continuity and unbroken historic tight between present and past 
proper of every aspect of Chinese records. 
 
The following tables are attached to illustrate a comparative exercise realized 
while analyzing the ideals, philosophies and facts that brought to the formation of the 
first centralized empire. The tables should help visualize a structural continuity in the 
basic political division of power in China since ancient times, and the roots of modern 
China political arrangements. I titled this exercise: “two eras on the mirror”, because I 
found many similarities in the Chinese organization of China in the second century B.C. 
and in the 21st century A.D. 
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Figure 7. Representation of the political structure of the contemporary PRC system 
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 The legitimacy of each dynasty, as the legitimacy of the PRC, has been based on 
the establishment of an official political philosophy (ultimately based on the winning of 
power struggle through the use of sheer force). The philosophy would influence each 
form of governance, which would contribute to the solidity of the political order. Chinese 
rulers have always believed that stability and unity in the social order are directly 
dependent on indoctrination of moral values and endorsement of official rules and 
regulations. 44  Accordingly, the Legalist doctrine imbued of Confucianism, which 
developed in the post Han-dynasty centuries, is the ancestor of the Communist doctrine 
(with Chinese characteristics) currently endorsed to maintain stability and legitimize the 
governance of the PRC. 
 In the Diagrams, the National People’s Congress (NPC - the highest organ of state 
power in name) is compared with the authority of the emperor. In Diagram 2., after the 
NPC tag I put an equal sign to indicate that the difference between the NCP and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is paltry. In other words, even if the components of the 
Standing Committee of the NPC represent: (1) the Communist Party; (2) other political 
parties and patriotic and democratic personages not affiliated to any political party; (3) 
social organizations of workers, youth and women; (4) the People’s Liberation Army; 
and (5) ethnic minorities each with a population more than a million,45 the real power and 
                                                
44 Fewsmith, Joseph, “Institutions, Informal Politics, and Political Transition in China,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 3, (March 1996), pp. 230 – 245.  
45 Chinese Government’s Official Website, The Standing Committee of the NPC, 
http://english.gov.cn/2005-09/02/content_28456.htm, accessed December 1, 2006. 
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 the actual control over the NPC is exercised by the members of the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP, which is composed of only nine members.  
In ancient time, following down in the pyramidal structure of the Chinese political 
organization, there were Grand Marshal, Chief Counselor, and Censor in Chief, while 
today we have symmetrically the Central Military Commission, the State Council, and 
the Supreme People’s Court. At this point, it suffices to notice that in both imperial epoch 
and in contemporary time the power continues to the local commanderies/provinces and 
counties.  
Thus, the remark to make is that local governments in imperial China had almost 
the same structure and tasks of local government in modern era. The things that change 
are probably more on the surface – means and methods, rather than the essence. That is, 
local entities were strongly controlled by the central authority of the empire and were/are 
required to answer to a hierarchical structure that was captained before by the emperor 
and today by the NPC/CCP. 
The assumption that NPC is subjugated to the CCP can become somewhat more 
evident if we analyze the structure of the Chinese Communist Party. It is arguable that 
there is a sort of system in the system; in other words, the organization of the Party is a 
sub-imperial-system in miniature. In Figure 8.46, it is possible to envision the great 
influence of the CCP. The CCP has a structure that ranges from offices for the 
propaganda to departments on security, media control, foreign affairs, etc. In addition, the 
hierarchical arrangement sees the National Party Congress and the Central Committee as 
                                                
46 Chinese Government’s Official Website, The Structure of the Chinese Communist 
Party http://english.gov.cn.html, accessed December 1, 2006. 
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 the role of the NPC in the government, and the Standing Committee of the Politburo as 
the real holder of the true authority. 
 





 Figure 8. Structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
 
In sum, after discussing the foundation of the first centralized Chinese empire, 
from a political and organizational perspective, but also from philosophical and literary 
records, we reach the conclusion that the imperial system of ancient China is the result of 
a mixture of different beliefs, which have all contributed to the overarching aim of each 
of the actors that acquired power in China throughout the centuries. The ancient 
perception of the world as a single body in the cosmic universe, Tianxia, merged with the 
Legalist and the Confucian beliefs. This unique entity that is China, the central state, the 
middle kingdom, is formed by the fusion of Heaven and “all-that-is under-heaven”.  
To conclude, I have analyzed the past of China to better understand the present. 
Each information reported in this essay is fundamental to understand China’s past and 
China’s origin, and to better debunk the logic behind the political interests of 
contemporary communist China, and to better speculate about the future path of China. 
 
The New Chinese Empire  
 
I would like to use now a rather psychological metaphor to discern how is it 
possible that China, after millennia, still has a pretty fix social structure and strangely this 
arrangement seems not to create explosively violent rebellions against the absolute 
authority. Therefore, I would suggest that as it is in a family with an authoritarian father 
and a weak mother, the sons are constantly afraid of the consequences of acting against 
the will of the father, so that silently and relentlessly obey to it, the same way happens in 
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 China where the kings, the emperors of the past, or today’s emperors – the supreme 
leaders of the CCP – have a role that is like that of an authoritarian father. The immediate 
question is, how is it possible that still today Chinese do not de-throne these ‘kings’? One 
answer can be found in the fact that fathers are sort of imposed by heaven, and we, as 
humans, are not able to overthrow the immaterial force of heaven. In other words, 
nobody can pick his own father, and it is fate that puts us in the families we grow in, 
there is no chance of changing this aspect. Sure, we can leave the family, repudiate our 
origins, vindicate abuses and cruelties, but we cannot change the blood inside us. It all 
comes back to the justification of power due to the Mandate of Heaven. Marxism-
Leninism has taken off the twentieth century’s Mandate of Heaven.  
The mandate of heaven is the expression of fate, and nobody can prescind from 
the caprices of fate. Not surprisingly the exact translation of the Chinese word for 
mandate of heaven, 天命 tianming, is fate. We can affirm that the principle of the 
mandate of heaven, (which includes the concepts of perfect harmony that can be reached 
between earth, heaven, and human kind; moreover, the idea of fixity of the universe and 
of the relations within it; finally, the perfect peace achievable with the command of the 
higher authority over Tianxia, the world, China), is the most authentic Chinese style of 
religiosity.   
At this point it seems necessary to spend a few paragraphs discussing what are the 
limits of Chinese religiosity. The long history of China, represented by an unparalleled 
continuity and a relative geographical isolation, prevented China from having close 
contacts with other ancient civilizations of the world, as the European, the Indian or the 
Persian. Isolation and continuity, gave strength to the Chinese perception of its own 
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 cultural superiority. The empire was the heart of the ancient Chinese Greatness. 
Century after century the Emperor, by heaven’s mandate, was the only recognized 
authority. In the hands of the Emperor were all kinds of decisions. The emperor also 
controlled religion. Every appearance that different religions made in China was always 
controlled and determined by the Emperor’s paramount power.  
In the Chinese Empire, although appeared numerous religions, they were all 
strictly supervised and controlled by the strong Imperial state system. For this reason, the 
few periods in which religious beliefs actually spread out in China, were those when 
religions came from abroad. When Buddhism entered China from India, it imposed its 
presence strongly. Being aware of the tremendous power of the Emperor, and the 
Emperor’s court during the ancient time, it is not impressive that Buddhism, firstly 
adopted by the aristocrats, became consequently the religion of state. Later, regular 
people, also, felt emancipation and great involvement with Buddhism. However, those 
experiences of conversion are now interpreted as a cause for the weakening of the New 
Empire. The Communist leadership took advantage of historical lessons. Religion is too 
powerful a mean, and it can easily be addressed against the established power. The 
Communist purging of any type of religion has concerned an intensification of social 
control over the beliefs and the spiritual life of the individual citizen.  
In the CCP’s orthodox narrative of modern Chinese history, religions are mostly 
seen as a product of foreign influence. The narrative about the history of the nineteenth 
century, the period recognized in China as the century of national humiliation (百年国耻 
bainian guochi), from 1839 to 1949, interpreted religions as consequences of the 
colonialist expansionism of Europeans and Americans. In that century, trading cargos 
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 were often shipped to China bringing priests and missionaries with them. The 
distinction between the goal of the trader and that of the missionaries was never made 
clear. The propaganda would just associate the arrival of barbaric individuals, who 
brought China, the Middle Kingdom, into decadence and ruin. Religion, as everything 
that came from abroad, was dangerous for the integrity of the Chineseness and for the 
national pride. 
According to the assumption that beliefs were always shaped on the will of the 
head of the state, even though during the Chinese Communist revolution all kind of 
religions were prohibited, we can argue that the Party found a new belief to impose. The 
Communist ideas, the principle of Marxism-Leninism became religion. The regime 
reproduced norms inspired by the darkest periods of Christianity. The Communist Party 
became a religious sect that existed to spread the true faith. It had its Inquisition for the 
detention and punishment of heresy. It employed the weapon of excommunication-public 
criticism against disloyal and unorthodox members. It possessed in the writings of Marx, 
its infallible scriptures, and it revered in Lenin and Mao, if not gods, prophets at least. 
The most serious problem of each one of the Chinese dynasties, and as one of 
them of the CCP as well, has always been the concern, of those in charge, of having to 
face instability. Instability can be feared with dreadful terror, if the reasons leaders stay in 
power is the mandate of heaven (being God’s will, the party’s will, or the heaven’s will). 
As a consequence, the most instable periods in Chinese history happened when a 
substitution in the leadership occurred, or when a leader dies. As during the empire, every 
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 time a succession occurred, it was time of conflicts, maneuver, factions and murder47, 
almost the same is true for the succession in the P.R.C. era.  
Legitimacy is the key requisite to govern with a credible authority, and 
consequently obtain stability. This is true both in democratic countries and autocratic 
countries. The huge difference is that in a democratic country the role of whoever is 
above us is, at least in theory, managed by a meritocratic system and electoral processes. 
The election procedure is not existent in autocratic societies. Hence, never an election has 
been held in China, and while it is quite logical for an empire not to practice elections 
(even tough the Roman Empire was based on votes of the Senate), it has not been the 
same for the Republic of China (1911-1916), or the government, or dictatorship of the 
People that is currently in power. In fact, the people of China had never had influence in 
the choice of none of their leaders. Ordinary Chinese people have lived with no space for 
questions or argument for centuries, thank to the justification of the harmonious and 
peaceful Tianxia, through the establishment of a savvy authority who would do only the 
best for the population, the belief that a government acts as a father, and with the idea of 
unconditioned respect for the father at the highest commanding position. 
There has been a perfect and ingenious equilibrium between the virtuosity of the 
Confucian-Communist-Egalitarian utopia and the strong brake imposed to supervise the 
society. The architect of this purely Chinese policy making is a genius, and this genius is 
identified with that first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, who is responsible for the beginning 
of this contradictory and perfect system of dominance. Contradiction is the word and the 
                                                
47 Terrill, Ross, The New Chinese Empire. And What it Means for the United States, 
(Cambridge: Basic Books, 2003), pp. 78-80. 
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 environment that everyone who is involved with the study of China has to encounter on 
books, or in reality. Ross Terril summarizes the oscillation between Legalism and 
Confucianism in this way: “But, a root, Legalism was the iron scaffolding of the Chinese 
empire; Confucianism was the silken costume”.48 This sentence is applicable for market 
economy and socialist economy, (cohabiting in China); pragmatism and idealism, (see 
Deng and Mao’s doctrines); extreme poverty and extreme prosperity (accentuated in the 
last decade for the modernization process developed by the CCP itself); freedom of 
religion in the constitution and lack of freedom in the reality; and so on and so forth. In 
sum, contradictions bring uncertainty, which bring instability and make the leaders be 
scared, so that they need to never loose the grab on the people.  
In the above-cited set of parallels I would like to underline a small group of 
primordial parallels, to confirm the thesis of resemblance and continuity if Chinese 
history. That is, the first Han emperor, Liu Bang, was a man of humble origins. The same 
thing is true for the first emperor of the New Chinese Empire, Chairman Mao Zedong. 
They both started a dynasty that loudly rejected the brutality of the previous commander 
in chief but obtained power through violence. In addition, both promoted the doctrine of 
the Moral Way to govern the middle kingdom, Liu Bang exploiting the principles of 
Confucianism, Mao Zedong applying Marxism-Leninism as guide of the moral and 
virtuous path toward “unity and stability”.49 Lastly, both ‘emperors’ believed that there 
                                                
48 Terrill, Ross, The New Chinese Empire. And What it Means for the United States, 
(Cambridge: Basic Books, 2003), p. 72. 
49 Terrill, Ross, The New Chinese Empire. And What it Means for the United States, 
(Cambridge: Basic Books, 2003), p. 126. 
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 was only one Son of Heaven, because the world cannot have two Suns, and that when 
the grip on the ideas vacillated, there would always be the strength of the law, and the 
sward. Ultimately, they both took move from the teaching of the initiator of the Chinese 
way of governance, Qinshi Huangdi. Again I will use a quote from Ross Terrill that 
clearly summarizes this notion of governance: “In the history of Chinese governance, 
Confucianism won its role only in symbiosis with its nemesis, the realpolitik philosophy 
of Legalism, the result was a brilliant tradition of statecraft.”50 
To conclude, let us play the sophistic game of creating syllogisms, which results 
easily rationalized for the numerous parallels recognizable in the Chinese historical path, 
Chinese development of ideas, and in the magnificent Chinese style of power 
preservation. A representation of the series of syllogisms I created is represented by the 
following Figure. 9. 
 
Figure 9. 
                                                
50 Terrill, Ross, The New Chinese Empire. And What it Means for the United States, 





Figure 9. Representation of Syllogism 
 
Hence, we can argue that fate is equal to the mandate of heaven. Then, mandate of 
heaven is equal to the most authentic form of Chinese religiosity. Religiosity becomes 
what is necessary to explain the order of the world and to answer big existential 
questions. Therefore, this explanation of the order of the world in China is equal to the 
concept of Tianxia. Consequently, Tianxia, and any type of functional ideology 
embedded in it, becomes Chinese religion. Religion is something to accept and to have 
faith on. In other words, usually religious values are a matter of faith, more than 
something to question about. Hence, mostly everything related to the approval and the 
estimation of Tianxia, involving the texts used or the ideology exploited (after 
Confucianism and Legalism, we have Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, 
Jiang Zemin “Three Represents”, and Hu Jintao’s philosophy of the “Harmonious 
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 Society” and the concept of “Eight Honors and Eight Shames”), everything has to be 
believed as the word of somebody from the highest, who allegedly desires only peace, 
unity and stability for his people. 
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The entire Chinese view of world order can be summarized with the word Tianxia 
and the concepts enclosed in this word. From a Chinese perspective, Tianxia (all-under-
heaven) represents the blend of universal values possessed only by civilized populations; 
that is, the Chinese civilization. In the West the word Tianxia has been rendered simply 
with the word: empire. Nevertheless, the idea of Empire and also the word comes from 
the Roman Empire, which the Chinese interpret as the first power with goals of 
expansion, dominance and aggressive control.51 For this reason, with the term Tianxia in 
China is possible to recall several different items: historical facts, philosophical 
meanings, political developments, and else. In other words, Tianxia can be interpreted as 
the quintessence of the Chinese culture. For instance, Tianxia reminds of when the first 
emperor unified China under the command of one sole man. To describe these 
circumstances, it was used a sentence with four ideograms Tianxia Yitong (天下一统), 
which signifies the unification through conquest. However, besides the act of conquest, it 
is difficult to separate Tianxia from the whole Chinese idea of empire, which includes 
                                                
51 Wang, Gongwu, “Tianxia and Empire: External Chinese Perspectives”, Inaugural Tsai 
Lecture, Harvard University, (May), 2006. 
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 ideas as universalism, cosmology, superior moral authority, and legalism, which guided 
behavior and administrated power in the civilized world.52  
Today, the official translation of Tianxia in the Contemporary Chinese Dictionary 
is as follows: “land under heaven; realm; world or China; but Tianxia also indicates rule 
and domination”.53 It is extremely significative that Tianxia is translated in China with 
the words: “world” and “China”, at the same time. This is possible because of the 
millenarian principle of the unique Oneness of China and the exclusive central position of 
China in the world as inimitable form of perfect civilization. Every Chinese who had 
studied history, or who simply has been educated by the elders of the family, grew 
protecting in his own mind this complex meaning of Tianxia. Even tough it is necessary 
to study thoroughly the history and the philosophy developed during the Chinese empire 
to be able to speculate about it; nonetheless, the vital source of the complex significance 
of Tianxia, and also of the approval that the concept of Tianxia maintained until 
modernity, is mirrored and nurtured by the structure of the society and the family itself. 
To the extents that, without the appreciation and the profound respect of the society, from 
the bottom upward, for the fix structures offered by Tianxia, it would probably not have 
become such a strong model for China. In other words, Tianxia had symbolized, and still 
symbolizes today, the range of assessments that goes from the authoritarian power of 
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 each single head of Chinese family, to the legitimacy that the acceptance of the concept 
conveys, from the ancient formation of dynastic succession, to the administration of laws, 
as far as the organization of the society and the shaping of the mentality of each member 
of the unique Middle Kingdom.  
 
Tianxia in Zhao Tingyang and other scholars  
  
 In this section I will explore several authors who have treated or are currently 
discussing the revitalized subject of the concept of Tianxia (all-under-heaven). First of 
all, I will describe Zhao Tingyang’s new book. Zhao Tingyang, Professor of Institute of 
Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, has written a book titled: “The 
Tianxia system”.54 Zhao Tingyang summarizes the complex meaning of the Chinese 
concept of Tianxia with a tripartite grouping: the geographical aspect of Tianxia; that is, 
the earth or the whole land that is under heaven, which characterizes the first connotation; 
the second meaning would be that of minxin 民心, people’s hearts, or else the “general 
will of all the people”55, principle that encloses the idea of mandate of heaven; and the 
third meaning is the one that most interests us: the ethical and political meaning of 
Tianxia, in which Tianxia is proposed as a plausible alternative to the well-known 
                                                
54 Zhao, Tingyang, 天下体系， 世界制度哲学论， Tianxia Tixi, Shijie Zhidu Zhexuelun, 
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55 Zhao, Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-heaven’ 
(Tian-xia 天下), Social Identities, Vol. 12. No.1, (January 2006), pp. 29-41. 
79 
 “international theory” based on the settlement reached after the Thirty Years War, with 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.  
The Peace of Westphalia is identified as the starting point of the division between 
nation-states that characterizes the contemporary international relations system. That is, 
the contemporary international order is based on the principles of state sovereignty and 
international law, whereas the idea of laws is directly related to the development of laws 
from the time of the Roman Empire first, and the British Empire later. In other words, the 
basic judicial system that formed the set of laws called international is founded on an idea 
of law as a principle governing action and procedures, which implies the existence of a 
sovereign authority and the obligation of obedience of all people subject to that authority. 
Hence, each body of laws functions as jurisdiction, which refers to the limits or to the 
territory within which the law applies. The various bodies of laws are divided into two 
main branches, Roman Law and Common Law; but between domestic and international. 
However, most of the international laws’ bodies are created by single states and for states. 
I will now explain how and why Zhao Tingyang in his book arrives to such a portentous 
conclusion; that is, to substitute this system with a new system based on Tianxia.  
 Zhao Tingyang believes that the concept of Tianxia, uniquely developed in China, 
is the ultimate representation of the utopia of the perfect world as a one-family-world. As 
we have discussed in previous chapters, the concept of family, and family relationships, 
has been the center of the Chinese society since the earliest times. Connected to the 
family there has been the idea of harmony within the world, where the highest fear was 
that of disorder (乱 luan). Zhao Tingyang says that the intertwining of these two ideas, 
family and harmony, is the core of Chinese Political Philosophy, which is based on the 
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 twofold meaning of the Tianxia concept; that is, the political and the ethical meaning. 
Hence, the order of the world is then divided and at the same time fully enclosed in the 
two units that compose the Tianxia system. Thus, the Tianxia system includes a political 
and an ethical meaning, which are complementary and characterized as follows. The first, 
proceeds from the Tianxia (all-under-heaven) to states, and then to families, while the 
ethical process goes backward, it is represented by the course that sees family as firstly 
involved, then states, and lastly the all-under-heaven. Therefore, the Tianxia system is 
omni-comprehensive of the entire world in any directions and takes care of the order of 
the whole universe. This transversal feature of the Tianxia is what ensures to it its 
capability of reaching two characteristics considered fundamental by Zhao Tingyang and 
by China since ancient time to govern the world: consistency (一致性 yizhixing), and 
transitivity (传递性 chuandixing) in the political system, whereas the uniformity in the 
family relations, safeguard the ethical aspects intrinsic and necessary for the perfetc 
realization of the Tianxia system. In this way, Zhao Tingyang gives reason for his 
definition of Tianxia as the mean for political legitimacy (政治合法性  zhenzhi 
hefaxing).56 In other words, he considers legitimate and justified an empire, which should 
comprehend the whole world, since this would be built for the ultimate peace and 
harmony of the whole globe.  
 This simplistic and naïve perception toward the righteousness and the legitimacy 
of the empire is unfortunately the foundation of Zhao Tingyang alternative to 
                                                
56 Zhou, Lian, “天下体系的两条方法论原则， Tianxia Tixi de liang tiao fangfalun 
yuanze”, 中国书评，Zhongguo Shuping, (Beijing, 2006).  
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 international relations theory. Zhao argues that the Chinese idea of all-under-heaven 
does not suggest geographical definite territories within certain borders; on the contrary, 
Tianxia proposes an a-temporal and a-spatial setting, which is supposed to represent the 
whole world. That is, Tianxia becomes the highest possible organization of the world; 
hence, becomes an institutional world.57  
 Zhao Tingyang refers to the Tianxia as a cultural concept utilizable for the 
political mission that tries to give order to the whole world. His writings have plenty of 
references to globalization as something tangible and inevitable; for this reason, Zhao 
underlines the revolutionary need for a political administration of the world-ness of the 
globe. He believes we have reached now a stage beyond that of administration and 
institutionalization of the international framework. He argues that the actual division of 
the international order is limited and divisive, more than unifying, and gives the United 
Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) as an example, and we shall see why.  
Since the 1970s, the most explanatory set of assumptions explaining the structure 
of the international order has been the Realist Theory. In the realist paradigm, 
nation/states are the primary actors and the basic independent political units of the 
international realm, which is anarchic. Each state’s highest preoccupation is survival and 
also the maintenance of sovereignty. For these reasons, states act rationally to 
strategically defend their self-interests. Zhao criticizes the western viewpoint of 
approaching the study of the society. Therefore, he criticizes the subjectivity of all the 
western political theories and philosophies, while the Chinese focus more on each self as 
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(Tian-xia 天下), Social Identities, Vol. 12. No.1, (January 2006), pp. 29-41. 
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 related to the Other. Here it comes back the idea of the fixity and reciprocity of the 
family and the societal structure. The consequence of this attention to the will and the 
interests of the Others, according to Zhao Tingyang, results in the determination of 
instituting a cultural empire and not imposing cultural imperialism.58 Of course, the 
model used to oppose his new ideas to the Western rudiments of international theory is 
referred to the Tianxia system.  
Zhao openly challenges the well-known Realist Theory arguing that in a 
globalized world the primary actor of the structure cannot be a nation/state anymore, 
whether the world is truly intentioned to reach global peace. Wang Gongwu, in a recent 
talk at Harvard University, explains how the development of the “New China” instead of 
making the new Chinese society ask for innovative ideologies, is becoming the cradle for 
the revival of antique and purely Chinese viewpoints: 
 
The collapse of the imperial tradition has opened China to the world economy, to 
modern science, to superior systems of law and to alternative political cultures. This 
tradition may or may not be replaced by a modern nation-state. But the peoples of 
China have come out of rebellions, revolution and innumerable reforms with 
extraordinary vigor and determination. Can they simply be another nation-state? 
The sheer size of China may make this very difficult. 
Or will the new knowledge in an age of globalization lead them to seek to recast the 
ideal of Tianxia?59 
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Zhao does not affirm that old Chinese empires have been the perfect example of a 
flawless global order; however, he asserts that the cultural ideals developed in China are 
the real possible alternatives to world governance. Only by applying the Chinese 
Tianxia’s basic meanings to contemporary world-order categories, would be possible to 
really understand the proposal he is making. Country as a unitary action should be 
discharged. States should become subordinate units of the highest authority of the world. 
What is needed is the acceptance of this holistic concept of the world, in which a supreme 
power would be the utmost legislator, which benevolently does not interfere in each 
country’s deed, unless a war is pursued. This idyllic God-like world-emperor would 
strive for universal harmony and peaceful order.  
Zhao acknowledges that unfortunately, we currently still live in a non-world, a 
failed-world in which self-interests still prevail over the needs of the Other. In order to 
change this, he believes everybody should study and appreciate the Chinese categories of 
family-state-world organization, because only through the processing of these models the 
whole world can recognize the absolute value of the Chinese superior Tianxia imperial 
system. 
Finally, as we have said a few paragraphs back, Zhao Tingyang openly criticizes 
those world or regional organization born recently in the West, as the United Nations 
(UN) or the European Union (EU). According to his beliefs, Zhao denies the importance 
and the influence of any of these types of regional or world association. He argues that 
                                                                                                                                            




 until the primary actor, commonly recognized, will be the single unitary state, there will 
be no peace and harmony. There is no need for a hegemon, he declares, but only the need 
to accept the whole-ness of the world. According to Zhao, internationality in a globalized 
world is an expression of the past! 
How many questions these concepts and perceptions raise? Zhao does not give 
exact explanation of how this world-ness, this global governance could be realized. Who 
in the specific could be part of the highest authority? Zhao’s debate seems an exaltation 
of the anarchy of the good intentions, with no valid exemplification of feasible 
applications of his theory in this world. Nevertheless, there are some inputs that come 
from his writings that are worth to be noted.  
Scholars around China have started discussing Zhao Tingyang’s writings and 
ideas mainly criticizing the feasibility of their realization. Nonetheless, it is interesting 
that an overall tacit approval of the main principles of the Chinese Political Philosophy is 
common in several critics I have been able to come across. For instance, Zhou Lian 
defines Zhao Tingyang’s theories fascinating and appealing, to the point that they will 
create and nurture wide discussions; however, he recognizes the presence of some 
contradictions in the relation between Zhao’s theory and practice, and also poses doubts 
on how and according to what process the Tianxia system can become a norm.60 To sum 
up, it seems that Chinese scholars are not rebuking the greatness of the concept of 
Tianxia, and everything that it embeds; however, they realize the difficulties and also the 
dangers that such concepts can cause in the researching of Chinese style of foreign policy. 
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 They worry about how could it negatively contribute to the popular idea of China as a 
threat for the West.  
The argument proposed by Zhao Tingyang certainly is very fascinating, and 
surely enough has given boost to a series of discussion regarding the different approaches 
in the West and in China to the problem of international relations. The most evident 
characteristic of this discussion is the stress put in the apparently huge differentiation 
between Western ideas and Chinese alternative ideas. It seems like Zhao asserts that there 
would be no possible complementary relation between the beliefs of one side in opposion 
to those of the other side. 
Actually, there is a scholar, Qin Yaqing61, who defines these differences between 
the so-called Westphalian system of international relations and the cultural-ethical-
political Chinese system of world order, supported by the fundamental teachings of the 
Chinese philosophical schools. While, he accepts that one philosophy cannot acts as an 
exclusive method of understanding in respect to the other, and acknowledges that both 
have important contribution to offer. However, intrinsic in his discourse, is implied his 
considerable appreciation for the Chinese style of philosophy. He exalts the moral virtues 
of the Confucians, the importance of rites and the reciprocity of relational respect. As a 
final point, Chinese scholars have been intrigued by the challenging contents of the 
writing of Zhao Tingyang. Nevertheless, we are free to say that they are not showing loud 
appreciation of it, but instead, they are fomenting a pretty careful praised discussion. We 
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 can surely affirm that the theme of Tianxia and its cultural-ethical-political alternative 
will not pass unobserved, as the same previously cited Zhou Lian62 is personally 
admitting in his critics of Zhao’s book.  
 
There are other interesting outcomes of the all newly revitalized discussion about 
the ancient cultural concept of Chinese imperial system, all-under-heaven and family 
structure. As we have quoted above, a luminary and internationally recognized scholar, 
Wang Gongwu, Director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of 
Singapore, has recently presented a new study at the Harvard University, explaining the 
improved interest in the study of Tianxia. In his talk, Wang Gongwu discusses how 
several authors, in particular the so-called huaqiao 华侨 – Overseas Chinese, from the 
19th and 20th century, have perceived the Tianxia and how they are considered today by 
Chinese in the mainland and around the world. 
Wang Gongwu refers to a group of people born and lived between 1850 and 1950. 
In the specifics, they are part of that group of people of Chinese origins, who for the first 
time studied Chinese culture and language not as their first language, but had the 
opportunity of leaving the country to study abroad. The century we are referring to, is the 
century in which China came to face its backwardness, the empire was decaying and the 
emergence of a plausible ideal of nation-state-building had become subject of frequent 
discussions. China was in a turning point of his history and had to pick the road to follow, 
while entering the modern era. There is one character cited by Wang Gongwu that I 
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 believe is worth noting. His name was Ku Hung-ming (also written Gu Hongming), 
who lived between 1857 and 1928. The reason why I deem important Wang Gongwu’s 
discussion about Ku is that Ku was known because of his strong contraposition of the 
violent Western civilization and the appraisal of the peaceful antagonistic forces of 
Chinese civilization. Ku had been educated in Germany, hence he used western language 
and categories to praise the Chinese Tianxia, the moral values and political justification 
linked to it, as opposed to the Western values’ system mainly measured by material 
categories like individual’s well being.63 The most interesting part of Wang Gongwu’s 
argument about Ku Hung-ming is his surprised description of how today his writings 
have been re-translated and publicized in Mainland China. It is, in fact, surprising that 
this renewed appreciation for his works is happening after a phase of extreme criticism 
toward him, which had started at the time of the movement of May Fourth 1919 and 
continued all the way through the establishment of the new Communist forces (1949) and 
later. It is indeed unforeseen and astonishing that a personage criticized because 
associated with the imperial power of the Qing Dynasty, also known for his high 
consideration of Manchu aristocrats, can today offer a strong analysis of the current 
society. Wang Gongwu explains this phenomenon exposing a very crucial observation:  
 
[…] it does suggest a renewed curiosity about one of Ku Hung-ming’s pet  themes, the 
ideal of tianxia as universal empire, and a pre-national or multinational perspective 
that stressed civilizational competence and respectability if not cultural superiority. 
                                                
63 Wang, Gongwu, “Tianxia and Empire: External Chinese Perspectives,” Inaugural Tsai 
Lecture, Harvard University, May 4th (2006). 
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 […] It is all the more interesting, therefore, that there has been renewed interest in Ku 
Hung-ming, the controversial reactionary that had once been mocked if not 
downright despised. Is he more memorable because he was eccentric and outspoken? 
Or is it because he asked the big questions about what China once stood for, not 
nation or empire but a moral tianxia that all should care for?64 
 
There is one final remark that I have extrapolated from Wang Gongwu lecture at 
Harvard University. That is, within those people Wang Gongwu described as 
representative of the national and public sentiment bursting out during the first years of 
the 20th century, there was one person who converted to Christianity. His name was Li 
Denghui, born in Java and educated in English schools in Singapore. Li Denghui was 
fond of his Chineseness, but also of his own choice toward his religious beliefs. He had 
accepted the dual possibility of being a Chinese deeply embedded in the Chinese culture, 
political and moral system, but also grown in the midst of Western customs and 
“adopting another set of tianxia ideals”.65 As a result, a hint can be drawn from this 
assertion. Thus, the Tianxia system, and its moral values, is an answer to the need for 
mystical questions proper of all human beings. Through the story of Li Denghui it 
appears that the Tianxia spirituality can be considered an alternative to the Christian 
spirituality, but also that the two forms of mystic approach to the proper behaviors to 
follow in life can be one complementary to the other. However, Wang Gongwu does not 
                                                
64 Wang, Gongwu, “Tianxia and Empire: External Chinese Perspectives,” Inaugural Tsai 
Lecture, Harvard University, May 4th (2006). 
65 Ibid, 15. 
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 report any revivals of the works of Li Denghui. This can be explained within the high 
control that the New Chinese “Communist” Empire maintains over the minds of his 
subjects. The CCP, using the propaganda organization and the religious control would 
rather censor a work that illustrate not univocal choices, while would promote the official 
translation of other works related to any themes can help boost the ideology of the 
“empire,” as those of Ku Hung-ming. 
 
Future Research  
 
To conclude, after having discussed the basic components of Chinese philosophy, 
I have illustrated how the main Chinese teachings on moral values have influenced the 
formation of the Chinese political system. I have traced back the key principles at the 
base of Chinese historical longevity, which re-conduce to two major philosophies, the 
Confucian and the Legalist. That is, on the one hand, the family structure as the central 
organization in the Chinese world; hence, the reverence for higher authority to maintain 
social order. Moreover, the respect for moral values, taught by the erudite of the society, 
through the observation of proper behaviors, pursuable by, again, respecting ceremonies 
and rites. On the other hand, we have the fear, imposed by the Legalist beliefs, of being 
punished by terrible laws and rules to apply in case of defections from the core structure 
of the social order. With the help of these two sections of teachings, in the midst of 
Confucianism and Legalism, is possible the Chinese empire durability and the idealistic 
Chinese order.  
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 I have then underlined the differences between China and the West, in particular 
the distinctions between the Chinese and the Roman imperial approaches regarding 
human beings; in addition, the diverse methods of building power, managing power, but 
also talking about power. As we have seen, the history and the structure of the Roman 
Empire give us explanation of what trajectory has developed from ancient Rome to 
Middle-Age Europe, until modern history. That is, there is a common thread between the 
perception of the authority and the division of territories and the application of laws 
during the Roman Empire and in the West nowadays. The same happens for China and 
the history of her civilization. The biggest difference is the lack of the development of the 
concept of individuality and subjectivity, offered in the West by Christian religious 
beliefs, and almost abhorred in China as a measure that could disaggregate the collective 
order. Moreover, it is clear until today that the application of laws also has been always 
sort of imposed by the top and never considered a mean for everybody in the society. The 
law was and still is the secret, often murky hand of the supreme power.  
Consequently, I have compared the traditional system of the Chinese empire to 
the new Chinese empire, and I showed how continuity and uniformity, which are the 
major and crucial preoccupations of every Chinese dynasty in power, have managed to be 
fully realized. That is, until today we are still asserting that Chinese political system is the 
most enduring, never-changing, firm, political organization in the entire world, as it is 
mirrored by the same fixity the family structure has maintained till these days.  
Finally, I have illustrated a new wave of thinking, based on the Tianxia system, 
that is not yet completely accepted or officially recognized as a proper Chinese belief yet, 
but that is being steamed up, voluntarily or not, within China. This is probably because of 
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 the fascinating historical and philosophical background it is founded on. Now, it is 
extremely important for us, outside China, to keep interrogating ourselves on the veracity 
of these new ideas, and also on the possibility of becoming the bastion of the new 
Chinese attitude toward the outside world. For this reason, it is poignant that we try to 
individuate the essential questions that Tianxia poses, in order to be able to research on 
all the possible answers we need to be able to suggest to face the Chinese mastodonic 
novelty.   
 
Key Puzzles for Future Studies 
Many questions are provoked by this discussion, which will deserve further 
investigation in future research. Surely enough, the global framework and the ever 
changing equilibrium of international relations will not allow some of these questions to 
remain unanswered. For this reason, we should not be afraid to try to understand the 
feasibility of the Chinese willingness to create an international system able to substitute 
the Westphalian system, idea that seems to be suggested by the discussions about the 
concept of Tianxia. The issue of substitution of the Westphalian system represents the 
paramount question that worries us. It is also the crucial uncertainty, which sort of sets 
the time for necessary supplementary investigations. We need to keep in our minds that 
there are two different groups of questions that it is essential that we address, and I here 
divide them in positive and normative questions. Answers to positive questions will allow 
us to improve our knowledge about the context where this discussion develops in. 
Certainly there cannot be ignorance of details, whether they are coming from little or big 
parts, or either from significant or less significant sections of the entire universe. In 
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 addition, this debate over Tianxia has raised some normative questions on how nation-
states should act and react in the contemporary worldwide scenario. 
As far as positive questions, we should reflect upon the reasons why there are 
some old authors of modern China, as Ku Hung-ming, vehemently criticized in the past, 
but now reaffirmed and appreciated in China. In addition, in case we want to make 
predictions, forecast potential events, and elaborate strategies to face the 21st century 
“peacefully” rising China, there is an entire world of affirmations and contradictions in 
current China that needs to be dealt with. That is, we should consider how could 
postulations about equality, people’s will and people’s dictatorship, peaceful rise and 
harmonious society be true and sincere. Is it possible to deem truthful the ostensibly solid 
creed of socialism with Chinese characteristics, when at the same time, the Chinese 
accept countless compromises with Western institution? On the other hand, while they 
adopted Western market economy, while they are currently an active element of the 
international western-categorized order, while they are modeling their legal system on a 
form coming from the West and the Roman tradition, they are at the same time firmly 
proclaiming that what they believe in and what they establish their doctrine on, is 
everything but coming from the West? We should ask ourselves if we are experiencing 
the same old Chinese story of the Chinese emperor with a silken robe on one hand and a 
sward in the other? And we want to react to that? 
 As far as normative questions, I deem reasonable to ask ourselves if, as required 
by the realization of the Tianxia system, while in need of a supra-power to govern the 
world, would that power above all be personified by China? Since China is the best 
connoisseur of the Tianxia ideal, could not she be offering herself as an answer? What we 
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 know for sure is that there is nothing that remains unplanned under the control of the 
supreme party (CCP) power. Differently, are the theories of “peaceful rise” and 
“harmonious society” only deterrence strategies to deceive and scare off the “others”, or 
are just transitory solutions, while trying to preserve the status quo for as long as it is 
needed? And how long would that long be? Would it be until they are powerful enough to 
attack the current hegemon of the international scenario? Or, are Chinese really 
convinced about the good intentions behind the target of the harmonious society? And do 
we deem them convincing? 
It is indisputably appropriate to be ready to answer these types of questions, 
because the West needs a more conscientious knowledge about modern and 
contemporary China, in addition to the knowledge of the past of China. Could we just 
speculate on China, or could we actually try to explore the country in situ and try to natch 
the real essence of China and unmask it? In the end, when relating to China, a big 
frustration can materialize, which would make us ask: “Is not every attempt on this 
subject just worthless? The power of the higher authority and the resistant rhetoric will 
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